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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines trends in Israel’s energy security policies in response to its 
discovery of large offshore natural gas resources in 2009–2010. It evaluates Israel’s use 
of energy diplomacy, selection of energy suppliers, and prioritization of energy 
infrastructure projects, and the potential impacts of greater energy abundance on these 
strategies. By comparing Israel’s energy policies before and after 2013, the thesis finds 
that energy abundance led Israel to employ a more protectionist approach to its energy 
sourcing decisions and participation in the global energy market. Israel has used its 
natural gas resources as a mechanism to increase its self-reliance, reduce its imports, and 
twilight its legacy oil transit and refinery industry. Energy abundance also led Israel to 
pursue a more collaborative approach to its energy foreign relations, negotiations, and 
conflicts. Prior to 2013, Israel employed a more combative and integrationist approach, 
forcefully asserting its energy requirements and leveraging its oil industry to negotiate 
with great powers and fuel suppliers and promote its access to the global energy system. 
Since 2013, energy abundance has given Israel greater confidence in its status as a 
regional energy power and more incentive to work cooperatively with other aspiring 
regional energy suppliers such as Egypt and Cyprus as the most effective way to build a 
local gas market and promote the export of its offshore natural gas. 
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As states conduct exploration for hydrocarbon resources, nationalist behavior over 
contested energy resources can destabilize regional security conditions and negatively 
impact foreign relations. Since Israel discovered large offshore natural gas fields in 2009 
and 2010, politicians and scholars have debated the significance of the offshore energy 
resources in the Levant region in shaping national interests, political alliances, and regional 
stability. Although natural gas exploration and production activity in the Eastern 
Mediterranean led to confrontational behavior between Turkey and Cyprus since 2011, less 
academic attention has been given to considering the impact of natural gas discoveries on 
the potential for conflict or cooperation between countries in the Levant region, particularly 
Israel’s approach to energy security and energy foreign policy. 
Building on a body of energy security research discussing the role of energy 
resources in shaping state behavior and foreign relations, the purpose of this thesis is to 
address the question: how have Israel’s energy security strategies changed since 
discovering offshore natural gas? As the United States has continued to work in close 
partnership with Israel in areas of mutual interest, policymakers, diplomats, and military 
professionals working with Israel and with other countries in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region can benefit from the findings, analysis, and implications discussed in this thesis. 
The scope of the research has included Israel’s energy situation leading up to the 
creation of the Jewish state, Israel’s historic responses to its energy scarcity and supply 
disruptions from 1948–2012, and Israel’s domestic and international policy responses to 
energy abundance from 2013–2021. The thesis compared Israel’s approach to energy 
security before and after 2013 to test two sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses 
considered whether Israel’s approach to the global energy market had become more 
protectionist or more integrationist. The second set of hypotheses considered whether 
Israel’s approach to foreign energy relations has become more combative or collaborative.  
The data sources used to conduct research include books, journal articles, energy 
and trade datasets and trend charts, government reports, and reports from domestic and 
xvi 
international energy organizations. Research on Israel’s primary energy security strategies 
was compiled, organized, and analyzed to determine whether and how Israel’s energy 
security strategies changed in response to greater energy abundance. The thesis found that 
since 2013, Israel has adopted a more protectionist approach to the global energy market 
and a more collaborative approach to its energy foreign relations. 
From 1948–2012, Israel used a more combative approach to its energy foreign 
relations in response to its limited domestic oil production and unreliable foreign energy 
supply. As the Arab-Israeli conflict and anti-Zionist hostility prevented Israel from 
establishing energy ties with regional Arab oil producers, the Israeli government forcefully 
advocated with great powers to meet its energy demands. Israel also used an integrationist 
approach to promote its access to global sources of oil. Lacking experience with the global 
oil market, Israel prioritized its oil storage, transport, and refinery operations to attract and 
maintain ties with major oil suppliers. Israel also relied heavily on energy diplomacy and 
supported overseas pipeline projects to establish strategic energy partnerships.  
Since 2013, Israel has shifted its energy security strategy to be more protectionist 
and collaborative, increasing its energy autonomy while also acting more cooperatively 
with neighboring states to promote the development of a regional gas market. Israel has 
placed greater value on protectionist isolationism, reducing its imports while also 
emphasizing the state’s new status as a regional energy power. Greater energy abundance 
has allowed Israel to behave more collaboratively to achieve its natural gas ambitions while 
decreasing its reliance on its oil and coal suppliers. Despite volatile relations with Lebanon, 
Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian territories, the Israeli political establishment together 
with Israel’s private commercial interests have used its offshore natural gas resources to 
further regional energy collaboration. 
There are four primary implications for this research to Israel’s economy, security, 
regional stability, and the study of energy security. First, because Israel’s protectionist 
approach has delayed a government windfall and led to higher natural gas prices for Israel’s 
economy, Israel may adjust its sourcing decisions in the future to balance its economic 
interests. Second, Israel’s tolerance level to respond to energy security threats against its 
domestic energy resources depends on the state’s ability to find sufficient substitutes 
xvii 
following a loss of supply. Third, although Israel’s collaborative behavior is most likely a 
response to energy abundance, its energy relations continue to be shaped by its internal 
politics and the politics of its regional energy partners. Lastly, although it is difficult to 
draw direct lines of causation between energy and foreign policy, the research findings 
suggest that energy abundance may encourage states to act less unilaterally interventionist 
and more congenially in foreign policy decisions. 
Further research could build upon the findings of this thesis by exploring the 
potential emerging role of renewables and electricity in Israel’s energy foreign policy 
relations with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the PA. It would be interesting to study Israel’s 
energy security strategy after the completion of the EuroAsia Interconnector to see if there 
are changes to Israel’s electricity policies toward its neighbors. Further research could also 
identify changes in Israel’s energy vulnerabilities related to renewables and electricity. 
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1 
I. ISRAEL’S ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since its founding in 1948, the state of Israel has suffered from energy scarcity and 
dependence on foreign oil. Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir reportedly joked at 
a state dinner in 1973, that Moses “took us forty years through the desert in order to bring 
us to the one spot in the Middle East that has no oil.”1 Israel’s domestic energy production 
prospects improved substantially in 2009 and 2010 when two offshore natural gas 
discoveries at the Leviathan and Tamar fields enabled Israel to transition from imported 
oil and coal-based electricity generation to domestically produced natural gas. By 
increasing the use of natural gas as the primary fuel source of the state’s electricity 
generation, Israel significantly decreased its reliance on imports.2 Between 2003 and 2015, 
Israel reduced its net energy imports from over 96% of total energy use to 65%.3 
Additionally, surplus domestic energy production enabled Israel to become a net exporter 
of natural gas beginning in 2017.4 Because Israel has historically been politically and 
economically isolated from oil-producing Arab neighbors, energy security has been a key 
factor in Israel’s domestic and foreign policy decision-making.5  However, its new energy 
abundance has the potential to impact the political, economic, and social dynamics of its 
approach. This thesis will therefore address the following question: how have Israel’s 
energy security policies changed since its discovery of offshore natural gas?  
 
1  “Mrs. Meir Says Moses Made Israel Oil‐Poor,” The New York Times, June 11, 1973, sec. Archives, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/06/11/archives/mrs-meir-says-moses-made-israel-oilpoor.html. 
2 Michael Ratner and Jim Zanotti, “Antitrust Case Complicates Israel’s Energy Future,” IF10140 
(Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2015), https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/
docview/t21.d22.crs-2015-rsi-0146?accountid=12702. 
3 “Israel Net Energy Imports,” World Integrated Trade Solution, accessed August 12, 2021, 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ISR/StartYear/1995/EndYear/2018/Indicator/EG-
IMP-CONS-ZS. 
4 “Israel Commercial Guide - Energy,” International Trade Administration, September 13, 2020, 
http://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/israel-energy. 
5 Clifford Krauss, “Israel’s Energy Dilemma: More Natural Gas Than It Can Use or Export,” The New 
York Times, July 5, 2019, sec. Business, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/business/energy-
environment/israel-natural-gas-offshore.html. 
2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
There is an on-going debate among academics, regional experts, politicians, and 
the media, regarding the impact of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries in 
shaping state behavior. While some regional politicians and media sources have lauded the 
significance of natural gas in coalescing new regional alliances, other academics and 
experts remain skeptical of the power of energy dynamics to influence state decision-
making ahead of entrenched geopolitical interests. Multiple states, in addition to Israel, 
stand to benefit economically from natural gas discoveries, as energy producer, transit, and/
or consumer states. Egypt’s Zohr field discovered in 2015 and the Aphrodite (2011) and 
Calypso (2018) fields near Cyprus have provided potentially valuable opportunities for 
Eastern Mediterranean states to profit from natural gas exports to Europe, the greater 
Middle East, or Asia, due to the size of the reserves.6 While some regional commentators 
have been cautiously optimistic regarding the potential for recent natural gas discoveries 
to boost regional cooperation, others see energy resources as a threat to regional stability, 
as an unnecessary complication likely to exacerbate geopolitical tensions.7 Most industry 
experts conclude that prospects for Israel, Egypt, and other Eastern Mediterranean states 
to enjoy the benefits of domestically produced natural gas resources lie in their ability to 
navigate complex geopolitical and economic realities facing the region. 
If natural gas resources are politicized, they have the potential to aggravate existing 
conflicts motivated by ideological, nationalist, or territorial disagreements, characteristic 
of the Middle East.8 Hostilities related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, anti-Zionist 
sentiments, and Islamic militancy are persistent threats to Israel’s ability to integrate 
economically with hostile neighbors. Energy pipelines have provided a valuable target for 
 
6 Nikos Tsafos, “What Does Calypso Mean for Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean Gas?,” Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, February 9, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-calypso-
mean-cyprus-and-eastern-mediterranean-gas. 
7 Henri J Barkey and Ellen Laipson, “The Prospects for Conflict or Cooperation,” The Cairo Review 
of Global Affairs, August 19, 2020, https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-prospects-for-conflict-or-
cooperation/. 
8 Gareth Jonas, “Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean Is About Much More than Natural Gas” 
(Center for the National Interest, October 28, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/conflict-eastern-
mediterranean-about-much-more-natural-gas-171535. 
3 
militants to disrupt energy supplies between Egypt, Israel and Jordan, as some local 
Egyptians view energy ties with Israel as theft of local resources, and/or a betrayal to the 
Palestinian cause.9 As Israel’s energy deals have largely been made between governing 
elites, natural gas ties with Israel provoked Jordanian public protest and an attempt by the 
Jordanian parliament to block the purchase of Israeli natural gas.10 Most notably, the 
discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean has exacerbated disputes 
between some states with competing sovereignty clams, as seen by Turkey’s use of naval 
escorts to protect its maritime boundary claims against rivals Greece and Cyprus, escalating 
tensions and the risk of confrontation.11 
This research is conducted in order to develop a better understanding how Israeli 
energy security dynamics could impact regional security concerns and threats to U.S. and 
allied interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region.12 Academic discussion has often 
considered the economic hazards associated with oil abundance, characterized as a 
‘resource curse’; however less academic study has been devoted to the impact of energy 
abundance on a state’s energy policies.13 With increasing numbers of countries becoming 
oil or natural gas producers and exporters, it is important to understand how these 
developments will affect their broader energy policies. The Israel case can therefore 
provide insights about how other new energy producers or exporters are likely to behave 
as they increase their energy production. Although some research suggests that oil-rich 
states may be more predisposed to initiate interstate conflict, other research has also shown 
that energy resources do not have a straightforward effect on state decision-making. Energy 
 
9 Al Jazeera, “Gas Pipeline in Egypt’s Sinai Attacked, Israel Imports Unaffected,” February 3, 2020, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/2/3/gas-pipeline-in-egypts-sinai-attacked-israel-imports-
unaffected. 
10 Marta Vidal, “Jordanians Voice Concerns over Imports of Israeli Gas,” Al Jazeera, January 30, 
2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/1/30/jordanians-voice-concerns-over-imports-of-israeli-
gas. 
11  “Angst in the Aegean - A Row between Turkey and Greece over Gas Is Raising Tension in the 
Eastern Mediterranean,” The Economist, August 22, 2020, https://www.economist.com/international/2020/
08/20/a-row-between-turkey-and-greece-over-gas-is-raising-tension-in-the-eastern-mediterranean. 
12 Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, “United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act,” II H.R.938 § 201 (2014), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/938. 
13 Michael L. Ross, “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” World Politics 51, no. 2 (January 
1999): 306, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054077. 
4 
dynamics tend to interact with social, political, and economic factors in unique ways which 
ultimately shape a state’s security and foreign relations priorities, which is why analysis on 
the impact of energy developments on Israel is both timely and relevant.14  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on the relationship between energy resources and international relations 
can be divided up into two main categories. The first section of the literature review covers 
the mainstream academic discourse on how changing levels of dependence on energy 
imports affects a state’s foreign policy and how increased energy production affect 
domestic politics. The second section focuses more narrowly on literature discussing how 
increased energy independence has affected the foreign policy of Israel, states in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, and major natural gas producers.  
1. Energy Dependence and Foreign Policy  
a. Rising Energy Dependence Constrains Foreign Policy  
A predominant body of literature has argued that rising dependence on energy 
imports has a constraining effect on a state’s foreign policy. Scholarship and political 
rhetoric on energy security since the 1970s has largely emphasized how energy 
vulnerabilities limit a state’s ability to exercise autonomous foreign policy. Western fears 
of dependence on Middle East oil largely materialized following the oil embargos of 1956, 
1967, and 1973, after which scholars and politicians began viewing oil as a tool of political 
coercion. The perils of oil dependence became actualized in October 1973 when most Arab 
country members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) 
announced the incremental reduction of oil production until Israeli forces withdrew from 
Arab territory contested during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.15 The potential use of energy 
exports to pressure the foreign policy of energy importers has acted as a powerful driver 
for energy dependent states to pursue ways to shield themselves against energy coercion. 
 
14 Jeff D. Colgan, “Oil, Domestic Politics, and International Conflict,” Energy Research & Social 
Science 1 (March 1, 2014): 198–99, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.005. 
15 Fuad Itayim, “Strengths and Weaknesses of the Oil Weapon,” The Adelphi Papers 15, no. 115 
(August 1975): 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/05679327508448393. 
5 
As energy security has become a matter of national security, a large body of related 
literature has analyzed the best mechanisms for energy dependent states to achieve energy 
security from unintentional or unplanned disruptions of energy imports, including those 
caused by terrorist attacks, market or supply instability, and political backlash, in order to 
protect state’s domestic stability.16 Some of the most common internal policy approaches 
to reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy are to increase domestic production, 
reduce consumption, promote substitution, and support research and development.17 Clean 
energy initiatives and energy mix transition have become increasingly popular in the 
Middle East, as states have looked to promote renewable energy and diversify their energy 
mixes by meeting energy demands outside fossil fuels.18 
Several case studies have focused on how resource-poor or energy-dependent 
countries such as Japan, the United States, and China have pursued energy security. After 
Japan experienced negative growth rates following the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, it adopted 
policies to improve energy efficiency and increased consumption of liquified natural gas 
(LNG) and nuclear energy in order to reduce its demand for oil.19 Japan’s share of oil in 
its total energy consumption declined from 72% in 1979 to 40% in 2010.20 In 1975, 
Congress banned the export of American crude in an attempt to reduce U.S. dependence 
on foreign oil, and lifted the ban in 2015, after the shale revolution led to a surge in 
American oil and gas production.21 China became a net importer of oil in 1993, and since 
the 2003 Iraq war has focused on using the military to protect sea lines of communication, 
 
16 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 69, https://doi.org/
10.2307/20031912. 
17 John S. Duffield, Fuels Paradise: Seeking Energy Security in Europe, Japan, and the United States 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 34, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=3318890. 
18 Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, U.S. to Cooperate on Security of Global Energy Supply: Saudi Press,” 
October 28, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-nigeria-usa-idUSKBN1X724T. 
19 Vlado Vivoda, “Japan’s Energy Security Predicament Post-Fukushima,” Energy Policy 46 (July 
2012): 135, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.044. 
20 Vivoda, 135. 
21  “America Lifts Its Ban on Oil Exports,” The Economist, December 18, 2015, 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2015/12/18/america-lifts-its-ban-on-oil-exports. 
6 
deepening diplomatic and economic interdependence with oil-rich states, acquiring oil 
through equity investment, and storing oil at overseas bases.22 
The term “energy diplomacy” has traditionally referred to the way that a state 
ensures sufficient access to fossil fuels by engaging other states diplomatically. Energy 
diplomacy has also been used to describe the behavior of major oil and gas producers and 
consumers that manage energy policy discourse and direct initiatives on energy security 
and cooperation.23 Despite the best efforts of national governments, the complexity of 
global, domestic, and local energy dynamics exerts significant challenges on a state to 
make sure that the behavior of commercial energy actors aligns with a state’s definition of 
the national interest.24  
In her work on oil coercion, Rosemary Kelanic explained the different ways that 
import dependent states use anticipatory strategies to protect themselves. Since the risks of 
oil coercion became apparent in World War I, states have varied in their responses to 
potential risks, using three main strategies: domestic self-sufficiency, indirect control, and 
direct control.25 For example, to counter the risk of a U.S. naval blockade on China’s 
maritime oil transport in times of war, China has employed an indirect control approach, 
by developing overland pipeline infrastructure to ensure it is able to meet its fuel 
requirements. In contrast, Great Britain took a direct control approach when it colluded 
with France and Israel to seize the Suez Canal out of fear that Egypt would close the canal 
to British oil imports.26 Kelanic argued that the more a state is susceptible to military 
 
22 Michal Meidan, “The Implications of China’s Energy-Import Boom,” Survival 56, no. 3 (May 4, 
2014): 180–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.920147. 
23 Anna Herranz-Surrallés, “An Emerging EU Energy Diplomacy? Discursive Shifts, Enduring 
Practices,” Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 9 (October 20, 2016): 1400, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13501763.2015.1083044. 
24 Andreas Goldthau, Wade Hoxtell, and Jan Martin Witte, “Global Energy Goverance: The Way 
Forward,” in Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game, ed. Andreas Goldthau and Jan 
Martin Witte (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2010), 342. 
25 Rosemary A. Kelanic, “The Petroleum Paradox: Oil, Coercive Vulnerability, and Great Power 
Behavior,” Security Studies 25, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 182, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09636412.2016.1171966. 
26 Kelanic, 182. 
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disruption and the deeper a state’s petroleum deficit, the more likely the state will adopt an 
extreme anticipatory strategy.27 
This perspective—that dependence on energy imports is dangerous to national 
security—is consistent with broader realist international relations theories. Structural 
realist Kenneth Waltz argued that economic interdependence increases the likelihood of 
interstate conflicts and is a weaker force in shaping international politics than power 
dynamics.28 In contrast, liberal international relations theorists assert that international 
trade encourages peaceful interstate relations. Norman Angell argued in 1911 that war was 
no longer economically expedient for European states, as the international financial system 
made trade more profitable than war.29 Similar arguments were later made by authors such 
as Richard Rosecrance, Bruce Russett, John Oneal, and Stephen Brooks.30 Some scholars 
have applied these arguments to energy policy, asserting that countries will trade for oil, 
rather than fight for it.31 
Scholarship related to geoeconomics has also evaluated the role of energy 
requirements and resources in national and international decision-making.32  While there 
is no standard geoeconomics argument for the role of increasing energy independence in 
shaping policy, based on assumptions of neomercantilism, Sanjaya Baru asserted that 
countries with assured access to natural resources such as food and energy have an 
 
27 Kelanic, 183. 
28 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 
14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772. 
29 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National 
Advantage, Third (England: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1911), vii–ix. 
30 Richard Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World 
(New York: Basic Books, 1986); Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace; Stephen G. Brooks, Producing 
Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
31 Carl Kaysen, “Is War Obsolete?,” International Security 14, no. 4 (1990): 42–64, https://doi.org/
10.2307/2538750; Emily Meierding, The Oil Wars Myth: Petroleum and the Causes of International 
Conflict (Cornell University Press, 2020). 
32 Ionniis Vidakis, Georgios Baltos, and Janis Balodis, “Geopolitics of Energy versus Geoenergy of 
Politics,” Sociālo Zinātņu Vēstnesis, May 14, 2018, 40, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1246786. 
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advantage over those countries which are dependent on vital imports.33 Similarly, Robert 
Looney highlighted the economic power of oil producers is partly shaped by its 
“hydrocarbon reserves, accumulated wealth, and the ability to extend this power through 
market manipulation and/or financial means.”34 Additionally, the amount of economic 
leverage a state gains from an energy partnership can depend on the level of demand and 
supply vulnerability, and the salience of energy to a state’s relationship with partners.35  
b. Rising Energy Independence Empowers Foreign Policy 
While most research on import dependence has suggested that rising energy imports 
can inhibit a state’s foreign policy options, less literature has evaluated how an increase in 
energy independence shapes foreign policy. Recent discussion on the impact of an increase 
in energy abundance has largely centered on the United States, which became a net exporter 
of fossil fuels in September 2019.36 Llewelyn Hughes argued that the U.S. reduction in oil 
import dependence likely had an “important but conditional effect on the collective 
preferences of policymakers.”37 Hughes argued that increased oil independence could 
reduce U.S. commitment to defending the security and stability of the global energy trade 
and diminish the value of the U.S. interventionist strategy in the Middle East.38 However, 
oil abundance is unlikely to impact the decision-making of those legislators who do not 
consider import dependence on the international oil market to be an issue of concern.39  
 
33 Sanjaya Baru, “Geo-Economics and Strategy,” Survival 54, no. 3 (June 2012): 54, https://doi.org/
10.1080/00396338.2012.690978. 
34 Robert E Looney, “The New Geoeconomics of Energy,” in Advances in Geoeconomics, ed. J. Mark 
Munoz, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2016), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315669021. 
35 Ahmed Mahdi, “Geoeconomic Leverage of Natural Gas Resources in the Mediterranean: The Case 
of Israel,” Contemporary Arab Affairs 12, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 151–52, https://doi.org/10.1525/
caa.2019.12.4.141. 
36 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Despite the U.S. Becoming a Net Petroleum Exporter, 
Most Regions Are Still Net Importers,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 6, 2020, 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42735. 
37 Llewelyn Hughes, “The Limits of Energy Independence: Assessing the Implications of Oil 
Abundance for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Energy Research & Social Science 3 (September 2014): 56, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.07.001. 
38 Hughes, 57. 
39 Hughes, 62. 
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c. Impact of Oil and Gas Production on Domestic Politics  
More literature has considered how increasing oil and gas production impacts the 
domestic politics of producer states. A well-documented, albeit surprising economic 
phenomenon related to resource abundance is the so-called ‘resource curse.’ In 1993, 
Richard Auty coined the term resource curse as a way to describe the need for resource-
rich countries to diversify their economies in order to avoid damaging boom-and-bust 
cycles.40 In the 1950s, economic development scholars had a more positive view of the 
benefits of abundant natural resources.41 However, an empirical study by Sachs and 
Warner found that countries which export a higher level of natural resource as a proportion 
of their GDP also commonly have lower rates of economic growth.42 
Given the negative impact that abundant natural resources can have on the 
economies of developing countries, a wide range of political scientists and economists have 
studied why states have struggled to mitigate the pitfalls of the resource curse. Research 
has suggested that high resource rents tend to encourage the consolidation of a strong 
centralized state, as resource-abundant states are less likely to ensure government decisions 
align with the needs of the population.43  Petroleum resources can be particularly damaging 
to states in which oil is used as a tool to concentrate power, as the weakening of political 
accountability of elites can lead to bad policy decisions.44 For example, hydrocarbon 
 
40 Ellie Perkins, “Book Review: Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse 
Thesis, by Richard M. Auty. London and New York: Routledge, 1993,” Critical Sociology 21, no. 1 (April 
1, 1995): 158–59, https://doi.org/10.1177/089692059502100114. 
41 Michael L. Ross, “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse; Reviewed Works: The Paradox of 
Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States by Terry Lynn Karl; Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Growth by Jeffrey D. Sachs, Andrew M. Warner; Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the 
Developmental Prospects of States by D. Michael Shafer,” World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 301, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054077. 
42 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth” 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1, 1995), https://doi.org/10.3386/w5398. 
43 Richard M. Auty and Alan H. Gelb, “Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States,” in Resource 
Abundance and Economic Development, ed. Richard M. Auty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
126, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3052798. 
44 Barma, Naazneen, “Petroleum, Governance, and Fragility: The Micro-Politics of Petroleum in 
Postconflict States,” in Beyond the Resource Curse, ed. Brenda Shaffer and Ziyadov, Taleh (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 332, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=3442009. 
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resources have been blamed for enabling Middle Eastern states to overuse external rent as 
the predominant form of income, leading to more corrupt and economically unproductive 
domestic economies. Autocratic rulers have managed a system of rent distribution which 
has perpetuated socio-economic inequalities and encouraged patrol-client relations.45 
Statistical measurements of the financial impact of energy exports on state wealth 
have primarily focused on the risks of Dutch disease. Coined in 1977 by the Economist 
magazine, the term Dutch disease was used to describe the economic hardship the 
Netherlands suffered following the discovery of significant natural gas revenues in the 
1960s.46 In the 1980s, scholars evaluated the way that oil revenues enabled oil producing 
Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia to subsidize industrial development, with the potential 
of benefitting indigenous manufacturers, instead of stifling manufacturing output.47 
Recognizing the risks of Dutch disease, some net energy export states have invested in 
sovereign wealth funds to target government spending and avoid a drastic inflow of foreign 
currency from gas exports which raises domestic prices and can cripple other competitive 
exports.48 
Scholars who view petroleum as a curse have emphasized the way that over time, 
oil producing Gulf states became increasing dependent on the export of a single commodity 
for state revenue. For example, OPEC member states forced to alter their crude oil 
production and pricing in accordance with OPEC requirements over time became heavily 
reliant on export revenues. In OPEC economies, hydrocarbon revenues contributed to 75% 
of total exports and 35% of GDP in 2008.49 In contrast, other scholars have observed that 
 
45 Sameena Hameed, “Political Economy of Rentierism in the Middle East and Disruptions from the 
Digital Space,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 7, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 55, https://doi.org/
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Arabian Diversification Efforts,” American-Arab Affairs, no. 27 (Winter 1989): 29, http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/40491. 
48 Glenn Yago, “We Need to Rethink the Citizen Wealth Fund,” The Jerusalem Post, September 9, 
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49 Jude Chukwudi Dike, “Measuring the Security of Energy Exports Demand in OPEC Economies,” 
Energy Policy 60 (September 1, 2013): 594, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.086. 
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oil wealth has acted as a blessing for countries like Norway. Although Norway was one of 
Europe’s poorest nations prior to 1969, oil served to jumpstart its economy, driving the 
state to become one of the most productive in the world, as the Norwegian government 
invested its oil profits in a manner which promoted long term economic growth.50 The case 
of Norway demonstrated that the resource curse and Dutch disease are not inevitable, as 
these economic problems are more likely the result of ineffective management of energy 
resources.51 
Resource curse scholars have also established a link between oil wealth and 
domestic conflict. In 2008, Michael Ross found that internal rebellion was twice as likely 
to occur in developing countries which produce oil than in non-oil producing states.52 Ross 
argued that oil producing states are more conflict prone because when oil wealth devastates 
a country’s domestic political and economic system, insurgents are able to fund rebellions 
and socio-economic inequalities aggravate ethnic grievances, fueling separatism.53 More 
recent analysis by Ross has clarified that the measurement of oil export dependence as an 
indicator of a country’s energy resources is likely biased toward poorer, more conflict-
prone countries, because impoverished countries are less likely to consume the fuel that 
they produce, increasing the rate of energy exports.54 
d. Impact of Oil and Gas Production on Foreign Policy 
Another body of scholarship has evaluated the relationship between oil wealth, 
internal rebellion, and international aggression. Jeff Colgan theorized that oil wealth 
combined with revolutionary politics leads to an increased state propensity to initiate 
 
50 Ali Elwerfelli and James Benhin, “Oil a Blessing or Curse: A Comparative Assessment of Nigeria, 
Norway and the United Arab Emirates,” Theoretical Economics Letters 08, no. 05 (2018): 1146–47, 
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Economics & Sociology 65, no. 3 (July 2006): 610, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2006.00476.x. 
52 Michael L Ross, “Blood Barrels; Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (June 
2008): 2. 
53 Ross, “Blood Barrels; Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict.” 
54 Michael L. Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 18, no. 1 (2015): 242, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359. 
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international conflict. Jeff Colgan argued that oil wealth can encourage aggressive state 
foreign policy as oil income amplifies revolutionary politics, increasing a leader’s incentive 
to initiate interstate violence.55 Colgan argued that petro-aggression was an important 
mechanism in Saddam Hussein’s initiation of conflict in the Iran-Iraq War and invasion of 
Kuwait, and Libya’s conflicts with Chad, Egypt, Tanzania, Israel, and the United States, 
among other examples.56  
2. Energy Independence and Foreign Policy 
a. Bilateral Israeli Energy Partnerships  
Scholarship on the role that an increase in energy independence will have on Israeli 
foreign policy has been limited. Regional news and commentaries have primarily focused 
on Israel’s endeavor to establish energy-related partnerships and agreements with Egypt, 
Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Greece, and Cyprus. Israeli 
government and media reporting have largely emphasized the bright future of Israeli 
natural gas exports in the region. However, regional scholars have argued that the viability 
of Israeli natural gas exports will largely depend on the unique perceptions of individual 
state governments, as states tend to prioritize security over energy cooperation, and 
political considerations over commercial interests.57 Although domestic politics, in the 
form of political opposition and public protest, have periodically disrupted Israeli energy 
partnerships, Israeli energy companies have continued to establish viable commercial ties. 
Despite the Jordanian House of Representatives’ rejection of a 15-year energy deal of 
 
55 Jeff D. Colgan, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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Israeli natural gas, Jordan’s constitutional court ruled that the 2016 contract could not be 
cancelled by Parliament.58 
Reporting has also shown the limits of energy cooperation as a potential mechanism 
for alleviating Israel’s conflict with Lebanon. Israeli media emphasized that maritime 
boundary discussions of contested waters between Lebanon and Israel to facilitate offshore 
energy exploration are not expected to reduce interstate tensions.59 Regional analysis of 
the motivation behind Israel’s September 2020 normalization agreement with the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) has predominantly emphasized UAE’s interest in political balancing 
against the Iranian threat network and Persian Gulf states’ fatigue with the Palestinian 
cause.60 However, Israel’s normalization agreement with the UAE has also included 
energy as a component of growing UAE-Israel ties. In October 2020, the energy ministers 
of the UAE and Israel issued a joint statement encouraging greater coordination in the 
energy sector, to include renewable energy, oil, natural gas, and water desalination.61 
Scholarship on the potential for Israeli energy partnerships has been mixed, highlighting 
both the possibilities and barriers to bilateral cooperation. 
b. Eastern Mediterranean Regional Energy Cooperation  
Regional commentators, news agencies, government officials, and academic 
scholars have debated the potential for Israel’s natural gas discoveries to encourage greater 
regional trade and multilateral cooperation for the entire Eastern Mediterranean region. 
Initial assessments of Israel’s 2009–2011 natural gas discoveries tended to be more 
optimistic about the potential for Israel to work with Turkey as a regional energy hub to 
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export natural gas to Europe.62 Although Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations had suffered 
after the 2008–2009 Gaza offensive and the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, two months 
after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to Turkish Prime Minster Erdogan, 
Turkish President Abdullah Gül, declared in May 2013 that Turkey was ready to contribute 
to an energy project, and Turkish conglomerate Zorlu Group lobbied Israel to lay an 
undersea pipeline from Leviathan to Turkey’s southern coast.63 
Scholarship has since become more pessimistic regarding the potential for Israeli 
natural gas initiatives to act as a bridge for regional cooperation. Brenda Shaffer argued 
that the insufficient size of the natural gas reserves, deep-rooted political conflicts, and lack 
of precedent for energy trade provide insufficient motivation for peace deals for states 
already in conflict.64 Proponents of the feasibility of greater Israeli integration and regional 
energy cooperation have lauded the potential benefits of the newly created East 
Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF).65 Although Israeli officials have emphasized the 
potential for Israeli natural gas to foster regional partnerships, the decision to exclude 
Turkey from EMGF, has been seen as a sign that geopolitical concerns still dominate state 
decision-making.66 Regional commentators have argued that Turkey’s decision to seek a 
maritime deal with Libya’s Government of National Accord to delineate maritime 
boundaries likely exacerbated the alignment of Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus against Turkish 
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interests.67 Hard-line pessimists have argued that because natural gas resources are so 
contentious, states should suspend hydrocarbon exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
completely to eliminate the risk of an energy conflict.68 
Yet, the commercial prospects of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas have also 
caught the attention of foreign oil companies, anticipating increased energy cooperation 
across the region, due to the potential prospects of both regional and global natural gas 
exports. In 2017, the European Commission highlighted the Eastern Mediterranean as a 
potential source of gas supply for the European Union (EU).69 Discussion regarding the 
construction of an ambitious Eastern Mediterranean pipeline largely focused on the 
European need to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas.70 However, other regional 
energy experts have argued that an Eastern Mediterranean pipeline to Europe is unlikely to 
be built, because European demand for natural gas is expected to decline over the next few 
years in favor of renewable energy.71 Previous attempts at establishing a framework for 
Mediterranean economic cooperation have been limited, as talks to create a political-
economic framework for European Union and Mediterranean countries in 1991 and 1995 
failed.72 Europe has previously been uninterested in regional energy cooperation with 
Eastern Mediterranean states, and it was only under pressure from Greece, Cyprus, and 
Italy that the EU agreed to investigate the feasibility of a maritime gas pipeline.73 
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c. Theoretical Insights from Major Energy Producers 
In the early 2000s, reducing U.S. dependence on Middle East oil became a central 
theme in the Bush administration’s energy policy, due to concerns about the market power 
of Middle East oil exporters to control pricing, and macroeconomic disruptions which can 
arise from oil price instability.74 Scholars also detailed the high financial cost of oil 
dependence, in terms of wealth transfer, dislocation losses, and the loss of GDP.75 In 2006, 
President Bush announced the goal of achieving U.S. energy independence by replacing 
75% of the oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.76 Later scholarship in 2013, 
highlighted the negative impact of energy scarcity on international relations and global 
stability. John Greer argued that decline in global petroleum resources would inevitably 
result in economic contraction, social instability, technological regress, and major social 
ruptures.77 
Despite the large body of literature on the woes of energy scarcity, very little 
literature has conceptualized the impact of energy abundance on a state’s domestic politics, 
economy, and foreign policy decisions. In this research, energy independence does not 
refer to energy isolation, as scholars have found energy isolation to be economically 
undesirable, and realistically impossible. For this thesis, Israel achieved greater energy 
independence when large offshore natural gas discoveries enabled the state to domestically 
produce more than its annual consumption requirements, allowing the state to become a 
net exporter of natural gas.78 Theoretically, wealthy natural gas producers like the United 
States, Qatar, and Norway, which have gained economic strength through increased natural 
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gas revenue and global influence, have enjoyed greater autonomy in foreign policy 
decisions. However, no study has done a comprehensive review of how an increase in 
energy independence has shaped the energy security and foreign policy decisions of major 
oil and gas producers. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature review considered the potential constraints that dependence on 
foreign energy imports can place on a state’s foreign policy decision-making, as well as 
the ways states respond to potential energy vulnerabilities. The literature review also 
discussed the role of energy trade in increasing risks of interstate conflict or promoting 
greater cooperation and peaceful foreign relations. Mindful of these approaches, this thesis 
identifies two hypotheses about how increasing levels of energy independence affect a 
state’s engagement in the international energy market and a state’s relationship with other 
energy producing or energy consuming states. 
The first hypothesis considers whether increased energy independence led Israel to 
adopt a more protectionist or integrationist response, pushing the state to remove itself or 
deepen its involvement in the global energy system. As previous authors have argued, when 
states are less dependent on energy imports, they have less need to establish or maintain 
connections with energy-producing states or to assert influence internationally to protect 
reliable access to energy resources. As a result, states which become more energy 
independent may prefer to reduce their participation or engagement in the global energy 
market. In contrast, energy abundance could have the opposite effect, encouraging states 
to seek greater interdependence with global energy partners. In the case of Israel, this 
“integrationist” response would predict that energy abundance would push Israel to 
increase its interdependence within the global energy system, as the state has less to fear 
from potential supply disruption from foreign suppliers. 
The second hypothesis considers whether increased domestic energy production 
would encourage states to behave more combatively or collaboratively with other states, in 
terms of trade agreements and the management of energy resources in contested territory 
or competitive environments. As previous authors have suggested, as oil wealth can 
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facilitate a consolidation of power, energy abundance could encourage more aggressive 
behavior towards other states. The underlying logic for this response is that when energy-
rich states are more secure, they can act more confrontational or assertive in the pursuit of 
their national interests. This hypothesis is also based on the observation that political elites 
may be emboldened from the economic benefits of energy abundance to act less amicably 
with other states. A more conflictual energy policy could also involve the securitization or 
politicization of energy resources, whereby elites use energy as a political weapon, or frame 
energy issues in terms of existential threats with strong security rhetoric. In contrast, an 
increase in energy independence—or a shift towards energy exporter status—could prompt 
states to become more collaborative as they have much to gain through international 
cooperation. The economic benefits of energy partnerships could also have positive 
political effects. In the case of Israel, this “collaborative” response predicts that energy 
abundance would inspire the state to demonstrate a greater commitment to joint energy 
production projects, promotion of increased inter-state energy-related ingenuity and 
communication, and more congenial behavior in addressing and resolving energy disputes. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study first discusses how Israel’s energy situation developed leading up to the 
creation of the Jewish state. Next, it examines the evolution of Israel’s energy security 
policies, including its international energy partnerships, from the state’s war of 
independence in 1948 to today. Lastly, this study evaluates whether and how Israel’s 
energy strategy has changed since Israel’s natural gas discoveries. A fundamental hurdle 
in this study is how to delineate clear lines of impact between energy developments and 
policy decisions. Economic, cultural, and socio-political factors all have the capacity to 
influence state decision-making. For this research, the thesis’ primary task is to isolate the 
specific roles of energy resources.  
To accomplish this, the thesis conducts a within-case comparison of Israel’s energy 
security strategy before and after the introduction of natural gas as a substantial component 
of Israel’s energy mix. It uses the year 2013 as its temporal breakpoint. Israel’s first natural 
gas discovery was in 1999. However, the state’s discovery and development of offshore 
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natural gas resources progressed gradually over several years, only revealing its 
significance January 2009, with the discovery of the Tamar gas field.79 Even after this 
discovery, it took several more years for natural gas to become a major component of 
Israel’s energy security mix. Between 2012 and 2013, Israel’s natural gas consumption 
increased by 170%, replacing oil and coal consumption.80 
The study’s independent variable is Israel’s level of domestic energy production. 
The dependent variable is Israel’s energy security policy. The term “energy security 
policy” refers to a state’s engagement with international energy producers, consumers, and 
transit countries. It includes energy negotiations and agreements with other state actors and 
international energy companies. It also includes domestic politics and regulations related 
to international energy trade and investments. 
The thesis uses its within case comparison to test two sets of hypotheses: that 
increasing energy abundance has encouraged Israel to adopt a more protectionist or 
integrationist response to the global energy system, and a more combative or cooperative 
relationship with other states. Its data sources include books, journal articles, news articles, 
energy and trade related datasets and trend charts, government reports, and the published 
reports of domestic and international energy organizations. 
To test the first set of hypotheses, the research will look for evidence that Israel’s 
relationship with the global energy system has become either more protectionist or more 
integrationist since discovering national gas resources. A protectionist response will be 
evaluated in terms of the state’s orientation and preferred level of connection to the global 
energy system. Specific indicators include reduced engagement with major energy 
producing states, initiatives to decrease reliance on external sources of energy, state-led 
energy reforms and regulations intended to promote domestic energy production to 
maximize national profits and the economic welfare of Israel, a heightened security focus 
on the defense of domestic energy resources, and a preference for the domestic energy 
industry over energy imports. An integrationist response can be divided up in terms of a 
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state’s relationship to international energy companies, government initiatives to establish 
or preserve connections with major energy producing states, and the primary mechanisms 
for the government to secure reliable access to energy resources. Specific indicators include 
deepening energy interdependence with energy suppliers, promoting energy infrastructure 
projects to promote participation in the global energy system, and securing energy access 
by aligning its energy interests with the interests of major energy producers and great 
powers. 
To test the second set of hypotheses, the research will characterize the combative 
or collaborative nature of Israel’s energy security policies prior to 2012, and after 2013. A 
combative response will be evaluated in terms of the governmental approach to energy 
foreign relations, negotiations, and disputes. Specific combative indicators could include 
forceful political maneuvering or aggressive diplomacy to secure energy interests, seizure 
and exploitation of contested energy resources, or adversarial energy activities conducted 
at the expense of other states or regardless of the impact or reaction of other states. A 
cooperative response can be evaluated based on the nature of bilateral negotiations, the 
terms of import and export deals, and the criteria for selection of international energy 
partnerships. Specific indicators of a cooperative response include state-led initiatives to 
create a legal framework to facilitate fair and equitable energy negotiations, interest in 
mutually beneficial trade agreements, and encouraging multilateral ownership and 
development of state energy resources. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The rest of the thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter Two examines Israel’s 
energy development from 1910–1948 and Israel’s energy security policies from 1948–
2012. Chapter Three will discuss Israel’s energy security policies since 2013. Chapter Four 
will evaluate the evidence, identify any shifts in Israel energy security strategy, and discuss 
implications to the research findings related to Israel’s economy, security, regional 
stability, and the broader field of energy security studies. The thesis will conclude with 
suggestions for further research. 
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II. ISRAEL’S HISTORIC ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGY 
A. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: 1910–1948 
Israel’s early energy situation was established by the activities of the first Western 
energy companies who conducted exploration and production (E&P) activities in the region 
after a British oil company discovered oil in Persia in 1908. During the early 1900s, British, 
European, and American firms negotiated concessions with the Ottoman Empire for the 
exploration, production, and distribution of crude oil in the Middle East region. While British 
and European companies focused its E&P operations in Iraq and Persia, the American 
company Standard Oil of New York (SOCONY) initially focused its efforts on Palestine. 
SOCONY hoped to find commercial-level quantities of crude oil in Palestine, having already 
established a distribution network throughout the Ottoman Empire.81 
Despite SOCONY’s early endeavors in Palestine, war impeded its discovery of oil. 
Palestine, which at the time was ruled by the Ottomans, was initially believed to have 
considerable oil prospects due to reports of asphalts, bitumen, and oil seepages in the Dead 
Sea, northern Jordan Valley, and Yarmouk River regions.82 In 1910, a local mining company 
was awarded exploration licenses in the Dead Sea and Yamouk River region and drilled an 
unsuccessful well in present-day Syrian territory.83 In 1913, SOCONY obtained exploration 
licenses in the Negev region, and prepared to drill its first oil well.84 However, the outbreak 
of World War I prevent SOCONY drilling, as the company was forced to abandon its 
operations and Ottoman and British authorities seized control of the drilling equipment, pipes, 
and trucks SOCONY left behind.85  
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Political instability after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the 
British Mandate for Palestine also delayed oil prospecting activities, as American-owned 
SOCONY had to reassert its claim to oil concessions in Palestine, as the British authorities 
allegedly impeded SOCONY’s legitimate access.86  Although SOCONY was allowed to 
complete its survey work in 1922, SOCONY ended its exploratory work in Palestine after 
surveys indicated the prospect for discovering oil in commercial quantities was slim.87 
SOCONY shifted its focus to Iraq in 1928, when American firms were invited to join the Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC), a consortium of companies developing Iraqi oil.88 Although 
SOCONY continued to distribute fuel, SOCONY did not renew oil production efforts in 
Palestine. Ultimately, Western interest in capitalizing on the discovery of oil in Iraq ended the 
earliest E&P activities in Palestine. 
In the 1930s, foreign oil companies began building oil infrastructure in Palestine to 
facilitate the transport of Iraqi and Saudi Arabian crude oil to the Mediterranean Sea for 
export.89 In 1934, the IPC completed a pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa, where the British had 
constructed a deep-sea harbor.90 Additionally, the British- owned Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC) built an oil refinery complex in Haifa as a joint venture with Shell.91 The 
complex, called Consolidated Refineries Ltd (CRL) began operations in 1939.92 Haifa 
subsequently served as an important refueling location for British warships during World War 
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II, leading Italian, German, and Vichy French aircraft to target the CRL from 1940–1942.93 
In 1944, the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) considered building its Trans-
Arabian Pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Haifa; however in the end ARAMCO bypassed 
British-controlled territory and built the pipeline to Sidon, Lebanon.94 See map of the 
pipelines Kirkuk-Haifa (highlighted yellow), Kirkuk-Banias (highlighted green), and 
Dhahran-Sidon (highlighted blue) in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Transnational Oil Pipeline Infrastructure, November 19, 195295  
Apart from the salaries of oil refinery workers in Haifa, the foreign-owned oil 
pipelines and refinery operations in Palestine were developed independently of the domestic 
economy and provided limited financial benefits to the local population. When foreign oil 
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companies negotiated the contracts for laying pipelines and constructing the refinery in the 
1930s, the British government did not stipulate that a share of Iraqi crude oil be set aside to 
be refined for Palestinian consumers. The British also did not require the IPC and CRL to pay 
custom duties on Iraqi crude oil, CRL operations or construction expenses. As part owners of 
the IPC and CRL, the British government collected commercial dividends and taxation on 
commercial profits and did not impose local regulations, royalties, or taxation. Despite their 
geographic proximity to Iraq, local customers in Palestine consumed oil transported from the 
Gulf of Mexico, at higher prices. Additionally, the oil distribution companies Mantacheff/
Esso, Shell, and Socony, which supplied consumers in Palestine, operated like a cartel with 
fixed market prices.96 
After World War II, foreign oil companies temporarily renewed well-drilling 
operations in Palestine. By September 1947, the IPC had acquired 29 prospecting licenses, 
through its subsidiary Petroleum Development (Palestine), and spudded Huleiqat 1, the first 
successful exploration well in Palestine.97 Despite the discovery, the outbreak of Arab-Israeli 
hostilities in the late 1940s again led foreign companies to end E&P operations. Their efforts 
had already been threatened by instability, as Jewish militants began targeting oil 
infrastructure in their effort to oust British authorities from Palestine.98  Following the United 
Nations vote to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states in November 1947, conflict 
between the region’s Arab and Jewish populations negatively impacted oil operations. In 
December 1947, Zionist forces conducted a grenade attack against Arab day laborers outside 
the CRL, which incited intercommunal violence between refinery workers leading to 42 
deaths and 49 injuries.99 By February 1948, three months before the First Arab-Israeli War, 
the IPC had given up its Palestine E&P ambitions.100 
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As the Arab-Jewish conflict intensified, the Arab League declared that Arab countries 
should boycott trade with Jewish entities in Palestine. In response, Arab leaders prohibited 
their citizens and resident foreign companies from exporting products manufactured by Arabs 
to the Jewish population or allowing the transshipment of goods to Israeli territory through 
Arab territory.101 After Jewish forces captured Arab neighborhoods and took control of Haifa 
in April 1948, the Iraqi government halted the flow of oil to Haifa. It diverted its crude to a 
refinery at Tripoli, Lebanon until a spur line to Banias was completed in 1952 (see Figure 
1).102  Egypt also prohibited the passage of oil tankers bound for Haifa through the Suez 
Canal. Although these decisions to disrupt oil flows to Israel resulted in financial losses for 
Iraq, Egypt, and Western states, Arab states were willing to accept them to impede Israel’s 
economic and political integration in the region. 
Western powers sought to persuade Iraq and Egypt to lift the de facto oil embargo on 
Israel. However, diplomacy ultimately failed to establish Israel-Iraq energy ties.103 The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq, which the British installed in 1932, was initially amenable to 
reopening the pipeline if Israel agreed to international management of Haifa.104 However, the 
states remained at impasse, as Israel was unwilling to give up control of port facilities and 
energy infrastructure and Britain did not compel Iraq to restart oil flows to Haifa.105 When 
France proposed the re-initiation of Iraq oil flows to satisfy European demand in November 
1948, the Iraqi Foreign Minister was noncommittal, and in February 1949 the Iraqi Economics 
Minister made a public statement that oil exports to Haifa would not resume until the Palestine 
dispute was settled.106 
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The loss of Iraqi oil at the onset of the 1948 war compelled Israel to engage the global 
oil market to satisfy its fuel requirements. Israel purchased petroleum products from multiple 
non-Arab suppliers. These imports included fuel oil and kerosene from Romania, aviation 
fuel from France and Mexico, oil drums from Italy, and fuel oil from a Jewish company in 
Morocco.107 Although the British Foreign Office authorized Western fuel distribution 
companies to provide Israel with an energy allowance to satisfy peacetime levels of 
consumption, the companies deducted independently acquired oil purchases to avoid giving 
the Jews an unfair advantage during the war.108 Keen to sustain its wartime energy needs, 
Israel restarted the Haifa refinery, without British staff or Arab labor, after the British 
evacuated the CRL in June 1948.109 To avoid jeopardizing relations with western companies, 
Israeli officials emphasized that Israeli-run refinery operations were temporary, and 
cooperated with foreign fuel distribution companies. 
B. AFTER INDEPENDENCE: 1949 - 1966 
Israel’s military victory against the Arab states in 1949 hardened its political isolation 
with neighboring states, at a time when integration with the regional energy suppliers was 
essential for Israel’s growth as a newly independent state. During the war, Israel had navigated 
the Arab embargo on oil shipments through strict regulation and storage of oil imports. 
However, after the war, faced with continuing energy shortages and limited financial capital 
to purchase oil resources, the state of Israel needed to employ effective strategies to meet the 
political complexities of the global energy market.  
After the war of independence, Israel developed a multi-layer approach to its energy 
security, which involved fostering its relations with foreign oil companies, promoting its 
domestic E&P industry, and building energy infrastructure. Israel promoted Western energy 
interests in Israel and negotiated with foreign oil companies to secure its continued access to 
affordable fuel. Israel also passed laws and subsidized state-sponsored E&P initiatives to 
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generate domestically produced oil supplies. Finally, the Israeli government took an active 
role raising funds to pay for its domestic oil pipeline infrastructure, storage tanks, and 
refineries and strategic petroleum reserve (SPR). Israel’s approach to energy security from 
1949 – 1966 primarily involved making the most of its legacy relationships with fuel 
distribution companies and European powers, exploiting the oil discoveries previously 
discovered by the IPC subsidiary, and encouraging foreign commercial interest in Israel’s 
petrochemical industry and pipeline infrastructure.  
During the first few years of Israeli statehood, the government negotiated with 
Western powers to address its severe energy shortage and finance its energy bill. Although 
some of Israel’s oil expenses were offset by an American grant-in-aid program, and the British 
government released £26.8 million in funds to the state of Israel between 1949 and 1950, the 
high cost of oil relative to Israel’s income contributed to Israel’s balance of payment deficit 
and a lack of sufficient foreign currency reserves.110 From 1951–1952, Shell and Esso 
supplied oil to Israel on a “cash for delivery basis”; however the British cut off its oil supplies 
due to the lack of payment and did not offer credit to cover Israel’s energy expenses.111  To 
address Israel’s perilous energy situation and alleviate its financial problems, the Israeli 
government negotiated with the German government to apply its World War II war 
reparations to finance its fuel payments to British companies in sterling, purchase small oil 
tankers, and construct five power plants.112 From 1952 – 1956, Germany paid £6.5 million 
per year for Israel’s crude oil.113  
Israeli officials cultivated relations with Western states and foreign oil companies to 
encourage foreign oil distribution activities within Israel. In response to the loss of Iraqi oil, 
Israel developed nuanced energy proposals to persuade the British government and Western 
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oil companies to continue their oil refining and export operations in Israel. Recognizing the 
importance of the continuation of Haifa oil refinery operations for maintaining its connection 
to global fuel supplies, in January 1950, Israel presented a comprehensive plan to Britain for 
Iraqi oil to be transferred through the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline, refined in Haifa, and shipped to 
foreign customers, without being consumed in Israel.114  In exchange for the agreement, 
Western oil companies would supply Israel with fuel sourced outside the Middle East.115 
Although Iraq-Haifa oil flows were not renewed, from May to July 1950, Israel successfully 
negotiated for AIOC and Shell to continue operating the Haifa refinery for local 
consumption.116  Despite the complicated dynamics following the end of the British Mandate 
of Palestine, Israel’s negotiations with Western oil companies ensured its continued access to 
oil supplies and alleviated pressure on Israel to independently secure crude oil imports.117 
As Israeli officials prioritized continued Haifa refinery operations, the state also 
created a national oil company to improve the affordability and availability of domestic fuel 
distribution for local consumers. Israel did not aggressively seize Western oil assets to launch 
a national oil distribution company. Instead, the state negotiated the introduction of a majority 
Israeli-owned petroleum company, which would take on 35% of the distribution of oil 
products in Israel, only partially curtailing the market share of foreign oil companies.118  The 
Israel Fuel Company (Delek) was founded in 1951 as the first government-owned gas 
distributor. Delek was created using a combination of Israeli private capital, Israeli 
government capital, and foreign capital, with the expressed purpose of purchasing crude oil 
abroad to have it refined in Haifa for domestic use.119  The government was heavily invested 
in the success of Delek’s energy negotiations, as Israeli ministers served on Delek’s Executive 
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Committee and conducted the company’s external negotiations on behalf of the 
government.120  One of Delek’s first actions was to lay pipeline from Haifa to Tel Aviv to 
reduce energy transport costs.121 
Delek also began negotiating new import agreements. After Iran nationalized its oil 
industry in 1951, the AIOC became interested in increasing Kuwaiti oil production, as the 
company lost its monopoly over Iranian oil. Delek is credited with persuading AIOC to 
increase its supply of Kuwaiti crude to Israel, despite political sensitives related to the Arab 
oil boycott, and also for encouraging Shell, Esso, and Socony Vacuum to supply Israel with 
Persian Gulf rather than Caribbean-sourced oil for significant cost savings.122  Although the 
British Foreign Office ended the Delek-AIOC oil deal when it was discovered to avoid a 
potential political conflict with the Arab League or ruler of Kuwait, Israel capitalized on the 
formation of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to secure access to Iranian oil.123 
After Iran and Britain settled their dispute over control of Iranian crude in 1954, Israel made 
deals with foreign oil companies SUPOR and Shell to purchase Iranian oil. Delek secured an 
agreement directly with NIOC by June 1955.124 Delek also successfully negotiated a deal 
with the Soviet Union, which lowered the price of light fuel oil for Israeli industry and 
electricity production.125  
Israeli authorities promoted the development of domestic oil supplies by establishing 
laws to enable local E&P activities. In 1952, the Israeli Knesset passed the Petroleum Law, 
which established state ownership of all petroleum on private and public land.126 The law 
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enabled the state to issue preliminary permits, oil drilling licenses, and production leases for 
30 to 50 years, and spurred the founding of national petroleum E&P companies. The 
Petroleum Law also established government oversight of production, ensured the supply of 
domestic needs first, and guaranteed state revenues through royalties, profit levy, and 
corporate taxes.127  
The establishment of a legal framework for oil E&P resulted in marginal domestic oil 
and gas production. After the IPC abandoned its drilling operations in 1948, newly established 
Israeli companies attempted to finish the work IPC had started. In 1953, Israel drilled its first 
exploratory well in the southern Dead Sea region, which was unsuccessful.128 However, in 
1955, the government-owned Lapidoth Oil Company and Israel Oil Prospectors successfully 
expanded the IPC’s abandoned Huleiqat 1 well and renamed it Heletz.129  The Helez-Barur-
Kokhav field produced between 2,500 and 4,000 barrels per day (b/d), for a total of 17.2 
million barrels (bbl) of oil from 1959 to 1967.130  Natural gas was also discovered, in the 
onshore Zohar field in 1958. Additional natural gas discoveries followed at the Kidod and 
Kanna’im fields from1960-1961.131  Despite these successes, the legacy of the foreign oil 
monopoly in Palestine, combined with the Zionists’ emphasis on agricultural development 
over oil exploration hindered Israel’s independent capacity to develop domestic oil resources. 
Production from these oil and gas fields was not sufficient to meet Israel’s domestic demand, 
so Israel remained heavily dependent on oil imports. 
As the Arab League pressured all foreign oil companies to leave Israel from 1954–
1960, Israel acquired foreign oil company assets in a state-regulated manner, by establishing 
a combination of public and private ownership in its burgeoning energy industry. For 
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example, when Esso offered to sell its assets to the state in 1954, Israeli officials negotiated 
for Delek to acquire some equipment and a percentage of clientele in the sale.132   In 1957, 
after Saudi Arabia gave Socony Vacuum an ultimatum to terminate relations with Israel, the 
Israeli government monitored the conditions of the sale of the company’s Palestine assets to 
a Jewish-American businessman who changed the company name to Sonol.133 In 1958, when 
Dutch-owned Shell terminated its activity in Palestine, the company turned over its marketing 
facilities to state-owned Paz.134 Finally, when British Petroleum (BP), formerly AIOC, 
notified Israel that it intended to sell its interest in Oil Refineries Limited (ORL), formerly 
known as CRL, Paz became its legal owner.135 By 1960, the Israeli government controlled 
70% of oil imports and distribution in the country through Delek and Paz, while privately 
owned Sonol managed the remaining 30%.136 
In response to the departure of Western fuel distribution companies, the government 
took charge of the state’s oil distribution and sought to establish Israel as a viable alternative 
to the Suez Canal for the transport of foreign oil. Israel initially sought Western funding for 
the development of its domestic energy infrastructure. Shortly after Egypt nationalized the 
Suez Canal in July 1956, the Israeli Foreign Ministry dispatched its ambassador to 
Washington to hold talks with the U.S. State Department about a solution to the Egyptian 
“bottleneck.”137 Israel argued that the United States should support the construction of an oil 
pipeline through Israel, because larger tankers could deliver more Persian Gulf oil to the port 
at Eilat to be transferred overland to the Mediterranean Sea, than smaller tankers could transfer 
through the Suez Canal. In addition to making Persian Gulf oil more profitable, the pipeline 
would make Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal less problematic. Despite Israel’s 
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appeals to Britain, France, and the U.S. for financing, the Eilat pipeline was not viewed as a 
viable alternative to the Suez Canal. 
To compensate for its lack of foreign investment, the Israeli government funded the 
construction of Israel’s first oil pipelines. After the Suez Canal was closed in October 1956, 
Israel began preparations for pipeline construction. In January 1957, private investors funded 
construction of a Haifa-Tel Aviv pipeline, and government-issued bonds provided 70% of the 
cost of the Eilat-Beersheba pipeline, which was completed in March 1957.138 Israel set up 
three oil storage tanks in Eilat in addition to installing 8-inch and 16-inch pipelines connecting 
Eilat, Beer-Sheva, Ashkelon, and Haifa, due to the low cost of pipeline (see Figure 2).139 
 
Figure 2. Map of Energy Infrastructure in Israel140 
To facilitate oil imports from Eilat, Israel negotiated an agreement with Egypt, 
following the 1956 Arab-Israeli War, to ensure Israeli ships were able to freely sail to port 
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Eilat. Recognizing the economic importance of Israel’ freedom of navigation in the Gulf of 
Aqaba for Persian Gulf oil imports, Israeli politicians raised the strategic importance of access 
to the port. Although Egypt had prevented Israeli ships from passing through the Straits of 
Tiran prior to 1956, after Israel constructed the oil pipeline and oil terminal at the port, access 
to Eilat became more politically sensitive. By 1957, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir 
declared that an attempt by Egypt to close the Straits of Tiran would be casus belli or perceived 
as an act of war.141 
In response to the supply disruption caused by Arab League pressure and the outbreak 
of the Second Arab-Israeli War, Israel attempted to discourage future breaches of import 
contracts by orchestrating the details of its energy agreement with Iran to maximize 
commitment. To replace the loss of fuel supplied by Western oil companies, Delek negotiated 
a two-year contract with the Soviet Union in July 1956, which increased the volume of its 
Soviet-supplied imports to 33% of Israel’s combined crude and fuel oil imports.142 However, 
after the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew from its contract when the war broke out in October 
1956, Israel prioritized its Iranian imports..143 Although Israel had previously diversified its 
energy suppliers, by the late 1950s, Israel imported over 90% of its oil from Iran.144 Iran was 
considered an ideal energy partner, as the terms of the agreement were economical for Israel 
and NIOC was eager to sell oil to Europe. Israel did not publicize its agreement with Iran to 
avoid political backlash and established foreign commercial entities to obscure the nature of 
the Israeli and Iranian energy partnership.145 
C. PEAK ENERGY SECURITY: 1967–1978 
Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran, leading up to the Six Day War in June 1967, 
had a modest negative impact on Israel’s energy security, due to the state’s previous 
accumulation of emergency oil stocks. In early May 1967, Israel’s defense ministry estimated 
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that the state’s SPR would cover four months of Israel’s energy consumption requirements.146 
 In addition, Israel had alternative means of obtaining oil imports. Although Iranian oil 
destined for Israel could not be delivered to Eilat, Israel was prepared to pay increased 
transport costs for the oil to circumnavigate Africa for delivery to Haifa. Israel could also 
purchase Venezuelan oil or request an aid package from the United States to offset higher fuel 
costs.147 When Egypt imposed a naval blockade on the Straits of Tiran on May 23, 1967, 
Israel considered sending an oil freighter operated by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) personnel 
and berthed in Masawa, Eritrea to pass through the Straits, provoke Egyptian fire, and obtain 
the pretext needed for an Israeli attack on Egyptian forces.148 However, because Israel had a 
buffer of energy supplies and sufficient alternatives, the state did not need to initiate hostilities 
with Egypt on the basis of energy. 
The outcome of the 1967 War proved advantageous for Israel’s energy security, as 
Israel capitalized on its access to lucrative oil fields in the Sinai, enabling the state to become 
self-sufficient in satisfying its domestic energy requirements.149   Israel used Sinai oil to 
bolster its midstream oil operations. After taking control of the Sinai peninsula, Israel 
negotiated a deal with the Italian state-owned company ENI and indirectly with Egypt to 
purchase ENI-produced Sinai oil in order to ship it to Eilat, and transfer it overland to 
Ashkelon.150  In exchange for the ENI partnership, Israel agreed to pay 50% royalties on the 
oil pumped to the Italian company.151  To facilitate the commercialization of Sinai oil, Israel 
expanded its tanker fleet, constructed a new refinery at Ashdod in 1969, and developed its 
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petrochemical industry.152 By 1971, the total volume of oil produced from the Sinai equated 
to the entirety of Israel’s annual domestic consumption.153 
Israel also significantly increased the previous Sinai production levels to export its 
excess crude oil supply. After taking control of 117 oil wells on and offshore Sinai, around 
Abu Rudeis, an Israeli government-owned oil company, Netivei Neft, significantly increased 
crude oil production at the Bilaiyim Sinai oil field from 4.5 million tons to about 6 million 
tons.154  According to the Egypt’s state-owned General Petroleum Company, Israel 
overexploited the Sedr, Assal, and Matarmah oilfields during Israel’s 12 year occupation, 
increasing production levels from 87,000 b/d in 1966 to 92,000 b/d in 1975.155 Israel 
conducted exploratory surveys, drilling, and granted new concessions to foreign companies, 
in addition to allowing other American and Egyptian E&P companies to continue operations 
unhindered.156 Israel also granted a concession to a Panamanian-registered company called 
Neptune, which explored and developed the offshore Alma oil field which began oil 
production in 1978. That oil was refined in Haifa.157 
In addition to acquiring Sinai oil, Israel used the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 to 
persuade Iran to invest in a substantial expansion of the Eilat pipeline. Prior to the 1967 war, 
the Iranian government was hesitant for NIOC to own part of the Trans-Israel Pipeline 
(TIPLINE) within Jewish territory, and sought to build a pipeline for Iranian oil to transit 
 
152 Elias Shoufani, “The Sinai Wedge,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 3 (1972): 90, https://doi.org/
10.2307/2535868. 
153 Bahgat, “Energy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict,” 938. 
154 The New York Times, “Israel Shaken by Scandal At Oil Fields in the Sinai,” The New York Times, 
November 15, 1971, sec. Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/11/15/archives/israel-shaken-by-scandal-at-
oil-fields-in-the-sinai-secret-details.html; Shoufani, “The Sinai Wedge,” 86. 
155 World Bulletin, “Egypt to develop Sinai oil fields ‘over-exploited’ by Israel,” World Bulletin, 
November 25, 2013, https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/middle-east/egypt-to-develop-sinai-oil-fields-over-
exploited-by-israel-h123659.html. 
156 Shoufani, “The Sinai Wedge,” 87–88. 
157 David K Shipler, “Israel Gives Up an Oilfield to Egypt In Biggest Sacrifice for Treaty Yet,” The New 
York Times, November 26, 1979, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1979/11/26/
111120388.html?pageNumber=2; J. P. Smith, “Egyptians Reportedly Agree To Sell Sinai Oil to Israel,” 




through Iraq to Turkey instead.158 However, after the Iran-Iraq-Turkey pipeline plan failed, 
and the Suez Canal was blocked, Mohammad Reza Shah approved of an Iran-Israel 
partnership to construct the TIPLINE as an important political step in protecting Iran’s 
national interests.159 The construction of a 42-inch pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean 
Sea was an attractive deal for Iran because the expanded pipeline reduced transport costs, 
increased throughput capacity, and gave NIOC more control over the transport of Iranian 
crude oil, making the government-owned company more profitable.160 
Israel worked to incentivize Iran’s commitment to supply oil to Israel by enhancing 
the commercial prospects for Iran’s investment in the expanded capacity of the TIPLINE. 
Israel facilitated Iran’s partnership in the energy arrangement by securing affordable loan 
financing for Iran from Germany, providing tankers for transport, and highlighting the 
commercial potential of Iranian oil sales to European customers.161 Israel marketed the 
TIPLINE as a solution for Iran to expand its customer base in southeastern Europe and 
Turkey. After the Shah became committed to the arrangement, NIOC signed supply contracts 
with Bulgaria and Romania in early 1967, and after TIPLINE was completed in 1968, Iran 
pressured foreign firms operating in Iran, including the U.S. Standard Oil Company, to 
channel their oil through the pipeline to meet the annual flow capacity requirements of 
European customers.162 Iran and Israel expected a quick return on investment for the 
TIPLINE, as the NIOC and smaller members of the foreign oil company consortium in Iran 
controlled 18% of the country’s total production and Iranian crude from Eilat was 
competitively priced on the global oil market.163 
The 1970s marked a high point for Israeli energy security, based on the state’s self-
sufficiency and reliable access to foreign oil. The TIPLINE guaranteed a virtually 
uninterrupted flow of Iranian oil for Israel’s domestic consumption from 1968–1978. The 
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acquisition of Sinai’s oil also reduced Israel’s reliance on Iran, as Israel replaced much of its 
Iranian crude oil imports with Sinai oil. Of the eight million tons of crude oil Israel planned 
to use in 1975, half was to be sourced from Iran, and nearly half from the Sinai.164  However, 
this period of security would be short-lived. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Israel entered 
negotiations for withdrawal from the Sinai, threatening one component of the state’s energy 
security. The Iranian Revolution created an additional shock.  
D. COLLAPSE AND RECOVERY: 1979–1991 
The fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979 caused Iran-Israeli energy trade to collapse, as 
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini ended all Iranian crude oil trade with Israel.165 
Iran also made its Iranian oil sales to other states contingent on the commitment to not resell 
Iranian oil to Israel.166 In response to Iran’s failure to provide imports, Israel effectively 
nationalized the TIPLINE by ousting Iranian partners and expropriating Iran’s investment.167 
The Israeli government then authorized the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company (EAPC), a 
subsidiary of the Iranian-Israeli joint venture Trans-Asiatic Company, to continue operating 
the pipeline, storage tanks, and oil terminals.168Although Israel had built up a six-month oil 
reserve in 1978, prior to the fall of the Shah’s regime, these stockpiles were not sufficient to 
replace the complete loss of Iranian oil.169  To compensate for the immediate shortfall, Israel 
ordered an 8% cut in fuel consumption by the armed forces and defense industries, imposed 
a one-day-a-week ban on the use of private motor vehicles, and increased its tax on 
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gasoline.170 Israel also replaced 20% of its oil imports with purchases from the spot market, 
from Mexico, Venezuela, Gabon, and Nigeria.171   
Lastly, as part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1979, Israel withdrew 
from the Sinai, losing control of its lucrative oil fields.172 To replace the loss of Sinai 
production, Israel entered into an oil supply agreement with Egypt, guaranteed by the United 
States. The Israeli government sought to use oil as a tool to ensure Egypt’s commitment to 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In exchange for its withdrawal from the Sinai, Israel 
demanded a multiyear fixed contract to purchase Sinai oil at Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) prices. Although Egypt did not agree to all of Israel’s original 
terms, Egypt agreed to provide Sinai oil to Eilat for 15 years and accepted a cash payment at 
a reduced cost, which amounted to about 30% of Israel’s oil needs and 10% of Egypt’s total 
exports by 1980.173 .Although the Israelis negotiated a deal to meet their domestic oil 
consumption needs, the state returned to dependence on foreign suppliers, reducing its energy 
security.  
After the Iranian Revolution, Israel’s energy situation also became more financially 
precarious due to the spike in oil prices caused by the drop in Iranian production and a surge 
of panic-buying around the world. The sharp rise in fuel prices hit Israel hard, as 99% of 
Israel’s primary energy consumption relied on crude oil, with only 1% sourced from solar 
energy and natural gas.174 Coupled with high oil prices, after its withdrawal from Sinai, 
Israel’s domestic crude oil production dropped to less than 1% of the state’s oil demand, 
reaching a low of 600 b/d in 1980. Israel also paid about $2.25 billion for 165,000 b/d of crude 
oil imports in 1980 compared to $700 million in 1978; the amount was nearly equivalent to 
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the entirety of Israel’s annual industrial exports.175  Since only Egypt and Mexico were 
publicly willing to sell to Israel on a contractual basis, Israel was forced to depend on the 
fluctuating spot market for the remaining 33–45% of its oil.176 However, by the mid-1980s, 
Israel was able to supply 35% of its crude oil from Mexico and 10% from Norway, reducing 
its dependence on the spot market to 30%.177 
Due to the political and economic risks of high oil prices and supply disruption, in 
1980, the Israeli government finalized an oil supply agreement the United States that had 
initially been negotiated in 1975 and 1979, in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the 
Sinai.178 Under the terms of the guarantee, the U.S. agreed to fill the gap in Israel’s oil supply 
in the event of a shortage, offer a competitive alternative to excessive price and insecure 
arrangements, or provide at least 4 months of supply if Israel was unable to replace the sudden 
loss of a main oil source.179 The agreement was noteworthy, as Israel became the first country 
to receive an exception to U.S. crude oil export restrictions, during a time when U.S. energy 
supplies were also viewed as vulnerable to fuel shortages. The United States took an active 
role helping Israel acquire oil supply from non-OPEC producers and financially compensated 
Israel for its lost revenue from forfeited Sinai oilfields. However, the United States never had 
to fulfill the terms of the 1980 Oil Agreement during the deal’s 15-year duration, as the 
specified emergency circumstances never materialized because of shifts in the global oil 
market.180 Beginning in 1981, Israel was able to purchase ample amounts of oil from non-
OPEC suppliers at reduced prices, due to an oil glut. 
By 1986, a decline in OPEC’s market share provided a significant boost to Israel’s 
diplomatic and economic interests. As the average price per barrel fell by half, from $32.19 
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in 1980 to $13-$14 by the mid-1980s, Israel enjoyed $1 billion cost savings, which amounted 
to 10% of Israel’s government budget.181 Additionally, the government was able to reduce 
state-controlled fuel prices while also collecting a profit on domestic fuel sales, which reduced 
inflationary pressures, eased Israel’s fuel-price sensitive high cost of living and allowed Israel 
to administer more public services.182 In 1986, Israeli government officials argued that lower 
oil prices enabled states like Spain, Ivory Coast, and Poland to pursue diplomatic ties with 
Israel due to a decline in Arab oil power, and claimed more non-Arab oil producing states had 
become interested in selling oil to Israel.183 
E. ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS: 1991–2012 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Israel developed new energy partnerships in Central 
Asia. Israel began importing oil from Azerbaijan when the state declared independence in 
August 1991.184 By 2002, Israel was the second largest importer of Azerbaijani oil, which 
fulfilled 25–40% of its domestic demand.185 Israel and Azerbaijan have strong political and 
economic linkages, due to the historic presence of a Middle Eastern Jewish (Mizrahi) 
community in Azerbaijan. In the 1870s, Eastern European Jews (Ashkenazi) also began 
settling near Baku, attracted by the region’s oil boom. Israel’s energy cooperation with 
Azerbaijan has deepened over time, as Israeli companies operate within Azerbaijan’s energy 
sector and a subsidiary of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan was granted oil drilling rights 
off the coast of Israel. 
Israel supported the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to 
transport Azerbaijani oil from the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the 
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Mediterranean Sea, to facilitate its transport to Israel.186 Figure 3 depicts the BTC route. After 
the BTC pipeline became operational in 2006, Azerbaijan became one of Israel’s top oil 
suppliers. Israeli energy companies Dor Alon and Delek also invested in a natural gas pipeline 
from Baku to Erzurum, Turkey which was completed in 2007.187 Israel has built a strategic 
partnership with Azerbaijan, based on military, technology, and energy interests. While 
Israel’s primary interest has been affordable and reliable oil imports, Azerbaijan has sought 
access to Israeli military, industrial, and agricultural technology. 
In the 1990s, Kazakhstan also became an integral part of Israel’s Central Asia strategy. 
After establishing diplomatic ties in 1992, Israel established robust economic, military, and 
political ties with Kazakhstan, which has the largest proven oil reserves in the Caspian Sea 
region.188 Israel has invested heavily in the Kazakh oil and gas industry, and Kazakhstan has 
provided about 25% of Israel’s annual oil imports.189 The government of Kazakhstan 
invested in the Haifa oil refinery in 2007 when the plant was privatized and shares offered on 
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.190 Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
stated that investment in the Haifa oil refinery was part of a larger effort to expand his 
country’s economic reach and strengthen its economy.191 Kazakhstan also expressed interest 
in refining Kazakh oil in Israel for sale to Europe and East Asia.192 
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Figure 3. Major Caspian Oil and Natural Gas Infrastructure193 
Beginning in the 1990s, Israel established energy ties with Russia, as the Russian oil 
industry found itself in desperate need of new ways to increase its oil exports. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union had a severe impact on Russian oil production, which dropped from 11 
million barrels per day (mbd) to around 6 mbd between 1988 and 1998, due to a sharp decline 
in Russia’s domestic oil demand.194 Reduced domestic consumption, led to surplus of 
Russian oil available for export; however, limited pipeline infrastructure capacity constrained 
an expansion in the volume of Russian exports, driving newly privatized Russian oil 
companies to seek new routes to reach new customers. Senior Israeli government officials 
capitalized on Russia’s need to expand its export partners, signing a preliminary ten-year 
energy agreement to purchase Russian crude oil in 1994.195 Israel began importing Russian 
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oil in 1997, and between 2001 to 2005, Russia was Israel’s top petroleum supplier.196 In the 
late 1990s, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon discussed purchasing Russian natural gas and in 2001 
Russian-owned Gazprom considered conducting E&P of Israeli natural gas, however neither 
of these gas proposals materialized.197 
Although Egypt continued to provide oil to Israel as part of the states’ peace treaty, 
Egypt’s importance as an oil supplier to Israel diminished between 1995 and 2000. While 
Israel had imported about 2 million tons of oil per year from Egypt through the TIPLINE at 
its peak, the volume dropped to 750,000 tons of per year by the early 2000s.198 The Egyptian-
Israeli peace agreement had stipulated that Israel was entitled to purchase Egyptian oil not 
needed for domestic oil consumption; however, as Egypt’s available crude oil supplies 
declined and Israel’s oil demand continued to grow, Israel was forced to look elsewhere for 
oil suppliers.199 Egyptian oil exports to Israel ended by 2002.200 
With the TIPLINE operating well below its 60-million-ton annual capacity, the EAPC 
sought to attract foreign oil companies to use Israel as a transit state for their oil and natural 
gas sales. To keep the TIPLINE relevant and operating at higher capacity, the EAPC 
transformed it into a bidirectional line, allowing the transport of oil from the Mediterranean 
to the Red Sea and vice versa, and doubled its oil storage capacity.201 In 2003, EAPC 
completed the reverse flow project of the TIPLINE, allowing Russian sour Urals crude and 
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Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) blend crude to be transported overland from Ashkelon 
to Eilat to be shipped by very large crude carrier (VLCC) to Taiwan.202 Israel hoped to 
improve its connection to the global oil market by offering reduced transit time, substantially 
reduced costs, and increased potential for sales and oil distribution for foreign oil suppliers. 
By establishing itself as a viable crude oil transport route to Asian states heavily dependent 
on crude oil imports such as India and Taiwan, Israel sought to market itself as a valuable 
energy partner to Russia and other oil traders. 
As Russia made plans to expand its energy infrastructure to support increased exports, 
Israel and Russia negotiated on the construction of a pipeline from Turkey through Israel, to 
facilitate Russian access to Asian markets. In the early 2000s, Russia had little export sales 
outside the European market, and while Russian oil was pumped to Black Sea terminals for 
shipment, ship size restrictions in the Bosporus prevented the transit of supertankers. In 2006, 
Israeli and Russian government officials discussed the construction of four parallel undersea 
pipelines from Turkey to Israel, which would carry oil, natural gas, water, and electricity.203 
Figure 4 presents the proposed 2006 Russia-Turkey-Israel pipeline route. The proposed 
pipelines would enable Russian energy exports to bypass both the Bosporus and Suez Canal 
to transport larger quantities of oil and natural gas more cheaply and efficiently, while giving 
Israel access to Russian fossil fuels, Turkish electricity, and a connection to European 
electrical grids.204 The proposed pipelines were never built due to technical and political 
obstacles, but Israel continued to prioritize access to and the transportation of Russian and 
Central Asian energy resources. 
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Figure 4. 2006 Russia-Turkey-Israel Pipeline Proposal205 
In 2005, Israel negotiated a secret deal to purchase natural gas from Egypt, however 
the deal was terminated in 2012 due to instability in Egypt.206  By 2008, Egypt had supplied 
up to 40% of Israel’s gas through an undersea pipeline from El-Arish to Ashkelon.207 The 
deal began to unravel when President Mubarak’s opponents challenged the legality of the 
agreement, and a court ordered an end to exports to Israel in 2010, accusing Mubarak of 
selling gas below market price.208 Although Egypt’s Oil Ministry appealed the court decision 
and renegotiated a higher gas export price, after a series of attacks on Sinai pipelines disrupted 
Israel’s gas imports in 2011, the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) terminated 
supply in 2012.209 
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III. ISRAEL’S DOMESTIC NATURAL GAS DISCOVERIES 
A. ENERGY CHALLENGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Israel experienced a decade of very high 
inflation and slow economic growth. After implementing an anti-inflation program, Israel’s 
economy stabilized in the late 1980s. This led to a high rate of economic growth from 1990–
1995.210 As growth continued, the state’s electric power system had insufficient capacity to 
meet domestic demand. In 2002, a spike in electricity consumption caused Israel to suffer 
nationwide blackouts, which cost the country about 700 million shekels.211 Israel’s electrical 
power was particularly vulnerable to interruptions because its electricity grid was not 
connected to regional neighbors. Consequently, any fluctuations in supply or consumption 
risked a spike in costs, power shortages, or blackouts.  
Faced with high fuel costs and an overburdened electrical grid, Israel needed a 
solution to its energy troubles, particularly as demand in critical sectors of the economy such 
as water desalination was expected to increase. Although Israel went to great lengths to 
increase energy efficiency, demands on national electricity production continued to grow.212 
Fortuitously, these developments coincided with Israel’s first significant offshore natural gas 
discovery, in June 1999. This chapter will describe how the Israeli government and public 
responded to offshore natural gas discoveries and the domestic and international policies that 
were implemented to address Israel’s energy vulnerabilities. 
B. FROM ENERGY SCARCITY TO ENERGY ABUNDANCE 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Israel sought to promote greater oil and gas exploration and 
production efforts through privatization and the establishment of independent public limited 
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partnerships to encourage drilling; however, activities remained infrequent and generally 
unsuccessful.213 After 17 years of effort, Delek made Israel’s first offshore gas discovery, 
Noa-1, in June, 1999 in partnership with Houston-based Noble Energy.214 In February, 2000, 
Delek and Noble Energy discovered a second reservoir, Mari-B, southeast of Noa; this 
became the first Israeli gas field to begin commercial production, supplying Israeli power 
plants by 2004.215  Although these initial gas discoveries were small, Delek and Noble Energy 
went on to make a total of 11 offshore gas discoveries, establishing the presence of abundant 
hydrocarbons in the Levant Basin (see Figure 5).216 Table 1 identifies the dates of Israeli gas 
field discoveries and production. 
 
Figure 5. Map of Israeli Oil and Natural Gas Fields217 
 
213 Security and Exchange Commission, “History of Oil & Gas Exploration in Israel - 1900 to 2004.” 
214 Delek Group, “History,” Delek Group, accessed August 16, 2021, https://www.delek-group.com/
about-us/history/; The Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Resources, “Exploration 
History.” 
215 The Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Resources, “Exploration History.” 
216 Delek Group, “History.” 




The most significant natural gas discoveries were the Tamar and Leviathan offshore 
fields, in 2009 and 2010 (see Table 1). These new fields established the Levant Basin as a 
petroleum province of global standards and gave Israel greater status as a potential regional 
energy producer. In a March 2010 report, the U.S. Geological Survey projected that the 
Levant Basin contained 1.7 billion bbl of recoverable oil and 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of 
recoverable natural gas, with Tamar and Leviathan holding a combined 26 tcf of gas.218 A 
2011 study found that, if half of Israel’s discovered gas was produced at existing extraction 
rates, Israel would have over 100 years of domestic supply.219 These discoveries 
dramatically changed Israel’s energy situation. 
Table 1. Israeli Natural Gas Reserves220 
 Gas Field Date Discovered Production Status 
Past Noa 1999 Produced from 2012–2013 
 Mari-B 2000 Produced from 2004 -2012 
 Pinnacles 2000 Production from 2012–2013 
Active Tamar 2009 Production since 2013 
 Leviathan 2010 Production since 2019 
Future Dalit 2009 Production date unknown 
 Aphrodite/Ishai 2011 Production set for 2024–2025 
 Dolphin 2011 Production date unknown 
 Shimshon 2012 Production date unknown 
 Tanin 2012 Production set for 2021 
 Karish 2013 Production set for 2021 
 Royce 2014 Production date unknown 
 Daniel  2015 Production date unknown 
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C. DOMESTIC RESPONSES 
1. Changing The Energy Mix 
The discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields prompted a dramatic shift in Israel’s 
domestic energy consumption mix. Since the oil crises of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980, Israel 
had prioritized the reduction of its consumption of oil, to mitigate future political and 
economic hazards posed by OPEC’s potential influence over global oil supplies and prices. 
Beginning in the 1980s, Israel began seeking energy efficiencies and transitioning oil-
dependent power plants to be fueled by coal. Israel also sought to reduce electricity demand 
by mandating the use of solar-powered water heaters on residential buildings. From 1980–
1985, Israel reduced its consumption of oil as a percentage of its electricity production from 
100% to 45%. The introduction of natural gas into Israel’s energy mix, starting in 2004, 
enabled Israel to further reduce oil’s contribution to electricity generation from 32% in 1999 
to less than 1% in 2015.221 
Beginning in the early 2000s, Israeli energy industry experts and government 
policymakers also viewed domestic natural gas production to reduce Israel’s consumption of 
imported coal. Although coal was considered less politically sensitive and volatile than oil, all 
of Israel’s coal supplies were imported from foreign countries, which made increasing 
domestic energy production inherently appealing.222  At the same time, Israel’s 
environmental movement began advocating policy interventions to address increasing air 
pollution, as the reduction of sulfur emissions at three power plants was found to provide a 
19% reduction in causes of death.223 Between 2012 and 2018, the Environmental Protection 
Ministry targeted Israel’s power stations as the state’s leading industrial polluters, arguing that 
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coal power plants were responsible for 25% of Israel’s pollution, generating 1,000 times more 
pollutants than natural gas.224 
In response to Israel’s natural gas discoveries, the government capitalized on the 
opportunity to further increase natural gas’s share of domestic electricity production for 
economic and environmental reasons.225  Natural gas consumption increased from 1.19 bcm 
in 2004 to 11.25 bcm by 2019.226 Increased natural gas consumption was led by the electricity 
sector; it accounted for 78% of Israel’s natural gas demand in 2019.227 By 2019, 60% of 
Israel’s electricity was fueled by natural gas, up from 26% in 2008.228 Israel’s confidence in 
the benefits of domestic natural gas production led the Ministry of Energy to set an energy 
mix goal of 83% natural gas and 17% renewables for electricity generation by 2030, aiming 
for the elimination in Israel’s use of oil and coal.229 
2. Energy Policy Reforms  
The possibility of a government revenue windfall and the perception that domestic 
energy production would free Israel from the chronic threat of energy shortages quickly 
captured the attention of the domestic population and the Israeli government.230 Natural gas 
became viewed as the solution to Israel’s energy problems. The government of Israel adopted 
several policy measures to oversee the exploitation of domestic natural gas, handle the 
economic impact, and manage government revenues. The Israeli National Economic Council 
expected significant net revenues from gas exports, estimating $1.5 billion annually per 10 
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bcm of exports.231 In October 2011, the Prime Minister appointed an inter-ministerial 
working group to recommend government policy regarding the management of the natural 
gas industry. The committee sought to guarantee energy security for Israel’s citizens, create 
certainty for the commercial market, maximize economic benefit, create competition, and 
provide policy flexibility to react to economic changes.232 
The inter-ministerial committee, led by Ministry of Energy and Water Resources 
director Shaul Tzemach, determined that the government had four primary objectives: to 
maintain reserves for the local market, to make the natural gas market attractive to foreign 
investors, to keep prices low for consumers, and to raise state revenue from the taxation of 
gas profits.233 After reviewing international gas policies, the committee recommended that 
45% of the natural gas be dedicated for the domestic market, leaving 55% for export. In 
response to the committee’s recommendations, national level debate ensued, and numerous 
interest groups submitted position papers to voice their concerns and interests.234 
During the spring and summer of 2012, Green Course, the largest volunteer 
environmental organization in Israel, together with 12 other environmental and social 
organizations, led protest rallies, public debate, and social media discussions to prevent the 
“theft” of natural gas through export.235 Green Course and other interest groups called for the 
cancellation or revision of the Tzemach committee’s plan, viewing natural gas as a strategic 
resource to reduce air pollution, lower costs of living, give energy independence and security 
to Israel, and create jobs. In response to the protests, in June 2013, the Israeli cabinet approved 
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a plan to reserve 60% of Israel’s natural gas for domestic use: a 15% increase from the 
originally recommended 45%.236 
In July 2014, the Knesset passed a sovereign wealth fund law to set up the Israeli 
Citizens’ Fund (ICF), intended to accumulate state revenues from taxes on natural gas 
windfall and revenues from the extraction of other natural resources.237 Israel’s sovereign 
wealth fund was created to prevent natural resources income from overheating the national 
currency, and to create a mechanism to fund long-term education programs, welfare, and other 
government services. Although the ICF was intended to launch in 2018, as of July 2021, 
Israel’s sovereign wealth fund had not yet made sufficient profits to reach the minimum $1 
billion shekels (US$307 million) required to begin investing.238 
The delay in government revenues is partially attributable to anti-trust disputes, which 
slowed the commercial development of Tamar and Leviathan. An investigation by the 
national Competition Authority found that the partners of Tamar and Leviathan held a 
monopoly on Israel’s natural gas market, which subjected them to government restrictions 
and delayed development timelines. In an effort to increase competition, encourage greater 
investment, and promote the development of existing gas fields, the government adopted the 
Gas Framework in 2015.239 Israel’s Energy Ministry allowed Noble Energy and Delek Group 
to keep control of Leviathan; however, Delek was required to sell its stake in Tamar within 
six years, and Noble Energy was required to decrease its stake in Tamar to 25%.240 Although 
Tamar and Leviathan owners signed contracts with the Israel Electric Company (IEC), 
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disputes related to competitive pricing and domestic quotas have complicated domestic 
production.241 
To increase the domestic use of natural gas and reduce dependence on oil imports, the 
Israeli Ministry of Energy has also adopted measures to replace gasoline and diesel-powered 
vehicles with electric cars and trucks that run on compressed natural gas. These include 
investing in expansion of its gas distribution system and vehicle charging stations. In 2018, 
former Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz stated that Israel plans to reduce taxes on electric 
vehicles and prohibit the import of gasoline and diesel-fueled vehicles by 2030.242 The 
Ministry of Energy has argued that Israel’s energy security is best served by increasing the 
use of domestic natural gas and renewables, arguing that reducing coal and oil consumption 
will decrease air pollution, which causes 2,500 deaths per year.243 
Israeli energy companies have also used anti-trust regulations to attract foreign 
investment in Israel’s natural gas industry. In 2020, Chevron acquired Texas-based Noble 
Energy, establishing the California-based company as a major investor in Israel’s offshore 
natural gas industry, holding a 25% stake in Tamar and 39.66% stake in Leviathan.244 
Separately, after Israel normalized relations with the UAE in September 2020, the EAPC 
signed a deal in Abu Dhabi, with Dutch-Emirati-Israeli Med-Red Land Bridge joint venture 
to transport Gulf oil to European markets and from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea.245 In 
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April 2021, Delek Drilling agreed to sell its 22% share of the Tamar gas field to a UAE-based 
energy firm, Mubadala Petroleum, which belongs to an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund. 
Israel also deepened its energy ties with Greece, after Greek-owned Energean made a 28–42 
bcm natural gas discovery at Karish in 2019.246  In March 2021, Greek-Italian joint venture 
IGI Poseidon signed an agreement with Israel National Gas Lines Company to build facilities 
in Israel for the planned East-Med pipeline.247 
3. Securing Gas Fields 
In response to Israel’s natural gas discoveries, the state has expanded its maritime 
security assets and changed its naval doctrine to protect its offshore natural gas 
infrastructure.248 According to Israeli Navy Commander Major General Eli Sharvit, 
defending Israel’s EEZ and strategic assets at sea has become a primary mission of the Israeli 
Navy.249 In 2011, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) planned to devote the majority of their 
Sa’ar 4.5 missile boat capacity to protecting Israeli offshore drilling rigs.250  In 2012, Israeli 
Navy officials requested a budget increase to fund its new mission, and when gas production 
at Tamar began in 2013, the Israeli Navy boosted its maritime patrols around Tamar and 
Leviathan.251 In addition to the increased maritime patrols, the Israeli Air Force began 
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) patrols, and Israel signed a 
contract in May 2015 to purchase six Sa’ar 6 corvettes capable of intercepting rockets, cruise 
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missiles, and ballistic missiles launched at gas rigs.252 During fighting between Israel and 
Hamas in May 2021, Hamas fired dozens of rockets toward the Tamar offshore gas platform, 
but the rig was protected by a ship-borne Iron Dome anti-missile battery.253 Hamas also 
attempted to launch a guided torpedo at the offshore rig; it was thwarted by the IDF.254 In 
order to protect Israel’s offshore gas rigs, the IDF has also significantly improved the 
offensive and defensive capability of its naval inventory, amended its maritime strategy, and 
expanded its naval patrol capacity. 
Israel has also used its improved naval security capability and shared energy interests 
as public diplomacy tools, which led to the initiation of defense cooperation with Greece and 
Cyprus. Since 2011, Israel has conducted annual air and naval exercises with Greece. These 
initially included the simulation of defending offshore gas drilling installations.255 According 
to Greek media, the dates of the April 2012 Noble Dina military exercise were changed to 
coincide with the signing of a tripartite energy memorandum of understanding between 
Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, to signal that the states were prepared to defend their offshore 
energy assets.256 In March 2021, Cyprus joined the annual Noble Dina military exercise with 
Israel, Greece, and France for the first time.257 Prior to 2011, the Israeli Navy was a small 
force focused on littoral coast guard operations.258 Israel had little military cooperation with 
 
252 Cohen. 
253 Judah Ari Gross, “Hamas Attempting to Hit Tamar Offshore Gas Rig with Rockets,” The Times of 
Israel, May 16, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-attempting-to-hit-tamar-offshore-gas-rig-with-
rockets/. 
254 Yaakov Lappin, “As Underwater Threats Proliferate, Autonomous Israeli Sea Vessel Stands Guard,” 
Israel Hayom, June 7, 2021, https://www.israelhayom.com/2021/06/07/as-underwater-threats-proliferate-
autonomous-israeli-sea-vessel-stands-guard/. 
255 Gabe Fisher, “Joint Israeli-Greek Military Drill Seen by Some as Rebuff to Turkey,” The Times of 
Israel, April 1, 2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-greek-us-military-run-joint-exercises-in-eastern-
med/. 
256 Stella Tsolakidou, “Greece Joins Israel-USA Military Exercise in Southern Mediterranean,” Greek 
Reporter, March 28, 2012, https://greekreporter.com/2012/03/28/greece-joins-israel-usa-military-exercise-in-
southern-mediterranean/. 
257 Dov S. Zakheim, “Uncertain of U.S. Intentions, Four Allies Exercise Their Naval Muscle,” The Hill, 
March 19, 2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/543754-uncertain-of-us-intentions-four-allies-
exercise-their-naval-muscle. 
258 Orhan Babaoglu, “Reliant Mermaid Naval Exercise: Increasing the Peacetime Role of Navies,” Policy 
Analysis, Policy Watch 943 (Washington Institute, January 18, 2005), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/reliant-mermaid-naval-exercise-increasing-peacetime-role-navies. 
57 
Greece or Cyprus, and primarily conducted humanitarian search and rescue and anti-terrorism 
force protection exercises to boost peacetime interoperability with Turkey and the U.S. 
However, since Greece and Israel signed a defense cooperation agreement in 2012, defense 
cooperation has expanded, as Israel and Greece signed a $1.65 billion defense procurement 
deal in April 2021.259 Israel has used its mutual energy interests with Greece and Cyprus to 
not only enhance its maritime security interests, but to also strengthen its broader security 
interests. 
D. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
1. Maritime Boundary Agreements 
Since discovering natural gas, Israel has accelerated its efforts to establish agreements 
to settle its maritime boundaries. Given the potential for disagreement with neighbors over 
rights to natural gas, Israel has prioritized the establishment of maritime boundaries to enable 
energy companies to commercially exploit Israel’s offshore gas reserves. Despite on-going 
conflicts with Lebanon and Hamas, and complex relationships with Cyprus, the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and Egypt, Israel has managed to engage regional neighbors in negotiations. 
Israel prioritized negotiations with Cyprus over the states’ bilateral maritime boundary 
because an official delineation of their EEZs was viewed as essential to Israel’s ability to 
secure and commercialize its offshore resources. In December 2010, Israel signed a bilateral 
agreement delineating a maritime boundary agreement with Cyprus, establishing the outer 
limit of Israel’s EEZ (see Figure 6). The maritime boundary agreement enabled Cyprus to 
create blocks and license its EEZ for international oil and gas exploration beginning in August 
2011.260  Israel has used the maritime boundary agreement with Cyprus to facilitate 
negotiations over the ownership of contested gas reservoirs. Since the discovery of the 
Aphrodite gas field in December 2011, which spans the Israeli and Cypriot EEZs, Israel has 
engaged in negotiations with Cyprus to ensure that Israel receives fair compensation for the 
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portion of Aphrodite that falls within Israel’s EEZ (see Figure 7).261 Additionally, Israel has 
engaged in multilateral E&P in Cyprus’ EEZ, as companies Delek Drilling, Shell, and Noble 
Energy jointly operate the Aphrodite field.262 Israel has also used its mutual energy interests 
with Cyprus to establish stronger bilateral ties. In February 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu 
became the first Israeli leader to visit Cyprus, discussing energy, agriculture, and tourism with 
President Christofias.263 Prior to 2010, Israel and Cyprus did not have close ties due to 
Cyprus’ support for the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel’s alignment with 
Turkey. However, Cyprus’ desire to exploit offshore energy resources enabled Israel to pursue 
diplomatic rapprochement. 
 
Figure 6. 2010 Cyprus-Israel Maritime Boundary264 
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Figure 7. 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Fields265 
Israel has also pursued maritime boundary negotiations with Lebanon to facilitate 
commercial exploitation of the Karish and Tanin gas fields, located near the states’ disputed 
maritime border. Although Lebanon and Israel technically do not have a formal land border 
agreement, as the “Blue Line” was established by the United Nations following Israel’s 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the states have been willing to discuss an agreement for 
commercial reasons.266 Since October 2020, the states have conducted multiple rounds of 
negotiations with U.S. mediation and UN sponsorship, most recently in May 2021. In 2018, 
Lebanon signed E&P agreements with a consortium of companies comprised of French-
owned Total, Italian-owned Eni, and Russian-owned Novatek in Blocks 4 and 9 (see Figure 
8).267 Total drilled Lebanon’s first offshore exploration well within Block 4 in early 2020 but 
failed to make a commercial discovery.268 Lebanon has been optimistic about its gas 
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prospects in Block 9, due to its proximity to Karish and Tanin. Lebanon’s Ministry of Energy 
and Water has extended the deadline for exploratory drilling in Block 9 until August 13, 2022; 
however, Total has said it will avoid drilling within the disputed portion of Block 9 until the 
border issue is settled.269 Maritime boundary talks had previously been blocked by 
Hezbollah; however, severe power shortages have likely driven Hezbollah to compromise, as 
an agreement would allow Lebanon to secure more foreign investments for E&P.270 
Although Hezbollah has made militaristic statements regarding its defense of offshore 
resources and threatening Israeli gas rigs, both Israel and Lebanon have preferred negotiations 
over military action to promote commercial investments.271 
 
Figure 8. Disputed Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary272 
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Israel’s desire to commercialize natural gas from Leviathan likely led the government 
to adjust its policy position related to Palestinian access to gas resources off of Gaza. Although 
the 1994 Oslo II Accord gave the Palestinians economic control up to 20 nautical miles off 
the coast of Gaza, the breakdown of the peace process and Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005 
drove Israel to restrict Palestinian maritime privileges and block the development of Gaza’s 
offshore gas reserves, which had been discovered by British Gas (BG) in August 2000.273 
Israel considered purchasing Gaza gas through BG; however, negotiations ended in 2007 due 
to irreconcilable differences.274 Although the PA signed the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea in 2015 and submitted a map of its maritime EEZ to the UN, maritime 
boundary negotiations did not begin in earnest until the PA cancelled BG’s exclusive rights 
to the Gaza gas reserves and Shell relinquished its stake in the gas to Palestine in 2018.275  
By establishing the Palestinian Investment Fund as the main stakeholder of the gas resources, 
an opening was created to allow Egypt to become an operator of Gaza’s gas reserves.276 Israel 
and Egypt also became more interested in bolstering PA control of Gaza’s offshore gas 
resources as a potential solution to the Palestinian energy crisis.277 The potential for Egypt, 
Israel, and the PA to mutually benefit from Gaza’s offshore gas resources enabled the PA and 
Egypt (and Israel, tacitly) to begin negotiating their politically sensitive maritime boundary in 
November 2020.278 
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By February 2021, the Egyptian Minister of Petroleum & Mineral Resources signed 
a memorandum of understanding for EGAS to help develop the Gaza Marine field, with 
Israeli approval.279 Israel has also supported plans by Qatar and the EU to fund a gas pipeline 
extension to connect Leviathan to Gaza by 2023, to meet Gaza’s energy demand until 
production from the PA-Egyptian-owned gas field begins.280 Despite the political sensitivity 
of Gaza’s EEZ, Israel has supported the negotiation of Gaza’s maritime boundaries with 
Egypt and the development of Palestinian natural gas, as these agreements have supported 
Israel’s ambition to solve energy liabilities, develop the regional gas market, and expand the 
region’s natural gas infrastructure. 
2. Regional Energy Trade 
After its discoveries of Tamar and Leviathan, Israel began examining its policies and 
options for exporting natural gas. In 2010, the most promising recipients for exports were 
Greece, Turkey, and Jordan, with high hopes for potential exports to Europe. In August 2010, 
Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed building a pipeline for natural gas sales to Greek Prime 
Minister Papandreou during a visit to Greece, without having discussed the plan with the 
Ministry of National Infrastructure.281 However, by the time the Israeli government decided 
that it would authorize the export of up to 40% of its natural gas production in June 2013, the 
prospects of exports to Turkey and Greece had diminished due to concerns about insufficient 
demand in the European gas market and geopolitical complications related to Turkey and 
Cyprus.  
In 2014, the most promising recipients for Israeli gas exports became the PA, Jordan, 
and Egypt. In 2014, Israel negotiated export contracts with the PA and Jordan. Although 
Israel’s export contract with the PA was cancelled due to Israeli anti-trust issues, the PA was 
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the first non-Israeli customer to agree to purchase Israeli gas, to fuel the Jenin power plant in 
the West Bank.282 Noble Energy also signed a 15-year natural gas deal with two Jordanian 
companies in 2014.283 Despite Jordanian public opposition toward energy cooperation with 
Israel, privately-owned Arab Potash Company and Jordan Bromine Company signed modest 
gas export agreements for Noble Energy to provide 66 bcm gas exports total from the Tamar 
field to industrial facilities at the Dead Sea.284 The exports to Jordan began in 2017.285 In 
2016, Israel signed a much larger 15-year contract to supply 1.59 tcf to Jordan’s National 
Electric Power Company from Leviathan, which began receiving natural gas through the 
Israel-Jordan Gas Pipeline in January 2020.286 Although Israel’s trade agreements with 
Jordan and the PA were all met with strong Arab public opposition, Israel has continued to 
seek energy trade with its Arab neighbors. 
Israel’s gas export deal with Egypt took longer to establish due to complications 
related to the termination of Egyptian gas exports to Israel in 2012, previously discussed at 
the end of Chapter 2. At the time, regional analysts viewed the failed 2005 gas deal as evidence 
that geopolitical tensions would continue to trump economic considerations, and some 
scholars feared that the failed gas deal would aggravate political tensions between Egypt and 
Israel.287 In response to the breach of contract, Israel requested international arbitration to 
compensate for expenses, as the IEC was forced to use more expensive diesel and fuel oil to 
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supply its power stations.288 In December 2015, the International Chamber of Commerce 
ordered the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum to pay $2 billion to IEC and the Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Company in compensation, which Egypt appealed.289 
Despite this dispute, Israel and Egypt continued to pursue commercial energy 
agreements. In 2018, Delek Drilling and Noble Energy announced a $15 billion export 
agreement to sell 2.3 tcf of natural gas from Leviathan and Tamar over a 10-year period to 
Egyptian company Dolphinus Holdings.290 The deal was amended in October 2019, 
increasing the total volume supplied to 3 tcf over 15 years, and exports began in January 2020 
through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG) pipeline (see Figure 9).291 Finally, Egypt and 
Israel agreed to a significantly reduced $500 million settlement over their gas dispute, which 
Egypt agreed to pay over a period of 8 years.292  
In addition to supporting regional export deals, the Israeli government has recently 
supported the increase of gas export levels by encouraging offshore pipeline construction. The 
Ministry of Energy has backed undersea pipeline proposals to connect Israeli and Cypriot gas 
fields to Europe, a gas pipeline from the Leviathan field to Cyprus, and a pipeline linking 
Leviathan to Egypt’s LNG facilities in Damietta or Idku (see Figure 9).293 
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Figure 9. Israel Ministry of Energy Gas Export Options294 
These broader export plans have not yet come to fruition. Egypt halted its own LNG 
exports from Idku for a few months in March 2020, in response to weak global spot prices 
triggered by increased supply from new American, Russian, and Australian LNG plants, 
as well as a decline in gas demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic.295 However, forecasts 
by the International Energy Agency (IEA) expected a strong rebound in LNG demand in 
2021, a 7% jump in global demand from pre-COVID levels by 2024, and moderate growth 
in global LNG consumption through 2040.296 To capitalize on a limited window of 20–25 
years for natural gas exports, before the gas market is expected to weaken, an inter-
ministerial committee recently recommended an easing of export quotas, from 40 to 52%, 
and not imposing export quotas on new gas fields.297 In 2019, Israel had previously 
loosened the requirement to connect all gas fields to Israel and reduced the amount of gas 
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required to be provided to the domestic market from each offshore gas field to increase the 
quantity of gas available for export.298 
In addition to enhancing the economic benefits that Israel receives from gas exports, 
the Israeli government has emphasized and attempted to increase the benefits that accrue 
to other regional states. Capitalizing on Egyptian and Cypriot enthusiasm following those 
states’ large offshore gas discoveries, Israel supported Egypt’s ambitions to use its existing 
LNG facilities to become a regional LNG transport hub, rather than constructing its own 
Israeli LNG export terminal. Additionally, Israel has supported Cyprus’ ambitions to 
become an “important hydrocarbons player in the Eastern Mediterranean” and an “energy 
interconnection node.”299 The Delek Group and Noble Energy are credited with making 
Cyprus’ first natural gas discovery (Aphrodite), and Israel has supported the EuroAsia 
Interconnector project, to link the power grids of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece (see Figure 
10).300 In addition, Israel has actively participated in the EMGF, viewing it as an essential 
component of its broader regional policy with Europe and the Middle East.301 From 
Israel’s perspective, these initiatives increase the commercial potential of energy 
development while lowering the security risks from regional instability.  
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Figure 10. EuroAsia Interconnector302 
In summary, the Israeli public and policymakers responded very positively to its 
offshore natural gas discoveries, as natural gas provided a welcome solution to its 
electricity shortages and provided opportunities to support Israel’s long-term economic 
growth and facilitate Israel’s diplomatic agenda to establish stronger regional ties. Initially, 
the government supported domestic natural gas to sales to the IEC to reduce its oil and coal 
imports. After the discovery of Tamar and Leviathan opened the possibility of a large 
government windfall from both domestic sales and export revenues, the government 
promoted the transformation of its domestic energy infrastructure and prioritized the 
establishment of a favorable regulatory environment to maximize state benefit from its 
offshore resources. The IDF also increased its maritime capability to defend its gas rigs 
from security threats and established greater defense cooperation with regional neighbors. 
Internationally, the government pursued maritime boundary agreements to facilitate the 
E&P of natural gas and authorized gas export agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the PA. 
The Israeli Ministry of Energy has also encouraged the construction of offshore pipeline 
construction to facilitate future exports to Greece, Cyprus, and Europe, promoted a regional 
gas forum to coordinate policies and resolve disputes, and supported the energy ambitions 
of fellow natural gas producers. 
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IV. ISRAEL’S ENERGY SECURITY POLICY RESPONSE 
Chapter four will first discuss the research findings by outlining the main energy 
security strategies employed by Israel from 1948–2012 and from 2013–2021 and identify 
noteworthy similarities and differences between these two time periods. The analysis will 
then assess the impact of natural gas discoveries on Israel’s approach to energy security. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss the implications of its findings for the field of energy 
security studies, Israel’s economy, and regional peace and security, concluding with 
proposals for potential areas of further research. 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Given the state’s limited energy resources for the first 65 years of its history, 
Israel’s energy policy was initially characterized by the primary objective of ensuring state 
survival. After Israel’s war of independence, Israel cultivated its relationships with great 
powers to circumvent the Arab embargo. As Western powers had conducted limited E&P 
in Palestine, the state capitalized on existing oil infrastructure, resources, and expertise to 
jumpstart Israel’s domestic E&P industry and maximized its opportunity for E&P in the 
Sinai to develop its midstream and downstream capability. As Israel struggled to maintain 
reliable fuel suppliers, officials prioritized expanding its oil transport infrastructure, tanker 
fleet, and petrochemical industry, and worked to orchestrate attractive energy deals with 
fuel suppliers. Due to the persistent threat of supply disruption, Israeli officials heavily 
managed oil contracts and fuel distribution, protected the state’s port access, established a 
SPR, and regulated domestic consumption. Finally, recognizing the liability of its oil 
dependency, the state prioritized energy efficiencies and pursued sources of energy deemed 
less politically and economically risky (see Table 2, left column). 
Since making large offshore natural gas discoveries, Israel has sought to maximize 
the social benefits of its recent energy abundance. Although the Israeli consortium that 
made the Leviathan and Tamar discoveries was principally profit-motivated, Israel’s 
natural gas discoveries have largely been beholden to public interests. Israel transformed 
its energy infrastructure to increase its domestic consumption of natural gas and established 
70 
a regulatory framework and sovereign wealth fund to manage state revenues from exports. 
However, rather than selling its gas to global LNG producers like Russian-owned Gazprom 
or Australian-owned Woodside, Israel built a local gas market and used natural gas as a 
tool to foster positive regional relations.303 Israel has negotiated regional agreements to 
facilitate gas field development in contested areas, encouraged foreign ownership and 
multilateral E&P of Israeli gas fields, and established a regional gas forum for greater 
collaboration. Israel has also used energy as a platform to project its influence and promote 
its larger security objectives, by improving its capacity to defend its maritime EEZ, 
supporting multilateral projects to export Israeli gas outside the Levant region, endorsing 
the energy ambitions of other states, and developing energy security strategies with other 
states. Finally, Israel has worked to establish the state’s position as a leader in the region’s 
emerging gas market and deemphasized its connection with its legacy oil industry (see 
Table 2, right column). 
Table 2. Comparison of Israel’s Energy Security Strategies 
1948-2012 2013-2021 
Leveraged oil infrastructure to preserve 
ties with Western energy companies  
Transforming electricity generation and 
transportation to use gas and renewables 
Pursued foreign funding and self-funded 
oil transport and storage capability 
Reduced coal and oil imports in favor of 
domestic production and renewables 
Expanded its petrochemical industry, 
constructed Ashdod refinery 
Established regulations and sovereign 
wealth fund to profit from gas E&P 
Orchestrated secretive deals to circumvent 
embargo, acquire regional oil supplies 
Decreased relevance of legacy onshore oil 
E&P, transport, and refinery operations 
Established strategic energy partnerships 
with Russia, Central Asian oil producers 
Increased maritime security of offshore gas 
platforms, views gas as strategic asset 
Emphasized energy diplomacy; cajoled 
energy guarantees from great powers 
Cultivated energy relations with potential 
regional customers, aspiring gas suppliers 
 




De facto nationalized TIPLINE after Iran 
ended oil imports; denied PA gas rights 
Negotiated agreements to facilitate gas 
field development in contested areas 
Maximized Sinai E&P, exported excess 
supply to develop domestic oil industry 
Supported foreign ownership, multilateral 
E&P, regional infrastructure projects 
Protected port access for oil imports, 
established SPR, regulated consumption 
Promoted regional gas forum to coordinate 
policies, communicate, resolve disputes 
Increased coal consumption and energy 
efficiencies to decrease oil imports  
Supported neighbors’ energy ambitions, 
developed joint energy strategies 
 
Israel’s energy security strategies before and after 2013 were similar in some 
respects, likely because elements of Israel’s early security threats continue to influence the 
state up to the present day. Despite Israel’s improved relations with some regional states, 
the potential for renewed conflict with non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas is 
on-going, making Israeli efforts to prevent supply disruption from threatening Israel’s 
stability and security just as critical today as it was in 1948. Additionally, Israel continues 
to view access to energy as vital to its national security, as government ministers influence 
the establishment of foreign energy partnerships, activities of domestic E&P companies, 
and the behavior of local energy consumers to ensure the energy sector supports Israel’s 
political stability and economic growth. As Israel’s political and economic situation 
remains complex, the government has continued to closely monitor, manage, and reform 
the state’s energy sector to protect its vital energy resources and respond to contingencies.  
Some of the major differences in Israel’s strategies involve its relationships with 
great powers and regional neighbors, government transparency regarding its energy 
policies, the complexity of its energy partnerships, and its acceptable level of risk. First, 
Israel has prioritized the development of its energy partnerships with regional states, rather 
than great powers such as Russia and Great Britain. Israel has also become much more 
transparent about its energy relations, in contrast to its prior secretive deals with Great 
Britain, Iran and Egypt. Israel’s commercial agreements with international oil companies 
have also modernized, as foreign commercial ownership and operations of Israeli gas 
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resources has become standard practice, in contrast to a government-dominated oil industry 
which struggled to acquire and retain foreign investment. Finally, Israeli energy security 
policy has become more confident, relying on its domestic industry, and forging potentially 
risky partnerships, perceiving the political and economic gains to outweigh the liabilities. 
B. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
This section assesses whether and how Israel’s energy security strategies changed 
after 2012, based on the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1. First, it finds that Israel 
historically employed a combative approach to energy deals and foreign partnerships, and 
an integrationist approach to its participation and connection to the global energy market. 
The second and third sections discuss the changes observed in Israel’s procurement of 
energy supplies from the global energy market and its energy foreign relations. Lastly, it 
determines that, since 2013, Israel has adopted a more protectionist approach to its energy 
supply and participation with the global energy market and more collaborative approach to 
its energy partnerships, in pursuit of building a regional gas market. 
1. 1948-2012: Combative-Integration 
From 1948 – 2012, Israel primarily used a combative approach in its energy foreign 
relations. As the state of Israel was established under insecure energy circumstances, the 
government hyper-vigilantly advocated for its energy requirements with great powers and 
defended its energy interests in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict and anti-Zionist 
sentiment. Israel aggressively promoted its energy interests by using the Haifa oil refinery 
as leverage to secure British fuel imports despite the Arab embargo, securing German 
financing for its fuel oil payments, cajoling the Shah of Iran into selling Israel oil, and 
obtaining an unprecedented energy supply guarantee from the United States. Israel also 
acted more adversarially toward regional opponents, rapidly exploiting Sinai oil resources 
during its occupation in a way that antagonized Egypt, punitively denying Iran its share in 
TIPLINE profits in response to the end of Iranian oil exports, and denying Palestinian 
requests for natural gas and electricity-related accommodations. 
Israel also pursued an integration-oriented approach to its participation in the global 
energy system. As a new state lacking experience with the global oil market, Israel 
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prioritized its relationships with greater powers such as Great Britain and the United States 
to meet its minimum energy requirements. Having inherited oil operations capability from 
its colonial legacy, Israel prioritized processing, storing, transporting, marketing, and 
refinery operations as tools to improve its status and relevance within the global energy 
system, and to establish negotiating leverage with foreign oil suppliers. Israel also relied 
heavily on energy diplomacy to establish agreements with major fossil fuel producers such 
as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia, and promoted pipeline projects with its primary 
energy suppliers to stay connected to its main sources of oil.  
2. Approach To The Global Energy Market 
The thesis’ initial two hypotheses explored how Israel’s increased energy 
independence affected its approach to its participation with the global energy market. 
Hypothesis 1A posited that increased independence would lead to a more protectionist 
approach, while Hypothesis 1B proposed that it would lead to a more integrationist 
approach. As previously outlined, the underlying assumption of a protectionist response is 
that, when states are less dependent on external sources of energy, they will choose to be 
more inward-focused and self-reliant, placing less value on connections with major energy 
producers, participation in the global energy market, and energy imports. In contrast, an 
integrationist response would indicate that, in response to energy abundance, states will 
choose to be more outwardly-focused, nurturing ties with major energy producers, 
promoting projects which increase access to the global energy resources, and pursuing both 
import and export interdependence.  
This thesis finds that, when its domestic energy supply increased, Israel adopted a 
more protectionist approach, using natural gas as both an opportunity and justification to 
increasingly withdraw itself from the vagaries of the global energy market. Although Israel 
cannot completely substitute natural gas and renewables for crude oil, Israel views greater 
separation from the global oil trade and reduced coal imports as in Israel’s best interest. 
Israel has demonstrated its protectionist approach through its focus on protecting its energy 
resources for domestic use first, setting ambitious goals to eliminate the use of oil and coal 
imports in electricity and transportation, and decreasing domestic upstream, midstream, 
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and downstream oil operations which were essential to Israel’s prior integrationist strategy. 
Compared to Israel’s previous integrationist efforts to entice the United States to invest in 
Israel’s pipelines to bypass the Suez Canal or to make the TIPLINE bi-directional to attract 
Russian and Caspian Sea oil exports, Israel is much less focused on its status as an oil 
transit hub for major oil producers or aligning its energy requirements with those of great 
powers. 
Israel’s focus has shifted more inward due to the expectation that Israel’s existing 
energy resources and technological innovations are sufficient to meet Israel’s future energy 
requirements. Since 2013, the prevailing public opinions and political rhetoric in Israel 
have highlighted the importance of protecting Israel’s gas fields as a strategic resource for 
domestic use. At the inauguration of the Leviathan rig in 2019, former Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “Israel is becoming an energy power. Israel is 
independent and is not dependent on anyone for its energy needs.304  As offshore gas fields 
have become the main fuel source for Israel’s electricity, the state has increased defense 
spending to protect its EEZ with heavily-armed patrol boats, drones, and submarines.305 
Israel’s security focus and political rhetoric regarding threats to its offshore energy 
infrastructure has shown that Israel’s domestic resources have gained strategic importance 
and are central to Israel’s energy security strategy.306  
Israel has also prioritized significant regulatory and infrastructure adjustments to 
move its domestic energy system away from oil and coal imports, to be more self-
sustainable. Israel’s goal of eliminating coal and oil imports in electricity generation and 
eliminating the use of petroleum and diesel in the transportation sector is remarkable, given 
Israel’s prior history of actively seeking reliable sources of crude oil, deemed vital for 
economic growth. One could argue that Israel primarily seeks to reduce coal and oil 
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consumption to reduce pollution and improve its climate footprint; however, Israel’s 
confidence in its energy abundance and position as a regional energy leader has given it 
ability to prioritize environmental considerations over safeguarding its continued access to 
the global oil market.  
Israel has also actively pursued policies since 2013 that decrease its participation 
in the global oil market.307 As Israel enjoys a strong economy and has made considerable 
diplomatic inroads with Arab states, making the oil weapon less potent, Israel has shown 
substantially less interest in domestic crude oil E&P. Although Israel continues to rely on 
crude oil imports, oil is viewed much less favorably by the public and policymakers. In 
February 2020, Israeli officials announced that the government would no longer issue 
permits for shale oil exploration, due to its high environmental costs.308 In September 
2021, Israeli Energy Minister Elharrar announced that Israel will no longer issue any 
onshore oil exploration permits.309 Israeli policymakers have also considered sunsetting 
the Haifa ORL which has acted as a central component of Israel’s energy security strategy, 
providing leverage to negotiate for oil imports, a resource to refine petroleum products for 
the local economy, and a major driver of Israel’s economy. After one of the refinery cooling 
towers collapsed in June 2020, the Ministry of Environmental Protection announced that 
the incident was a “signal about the beginning of the end” for Haifa’s petrochemical 
industry.310 In April 2021, a government panel recommended closing the oil refineries in 
the Haifa area within 10 years.311 The Israeli public and policymakers have also questioned 
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the necessity of a recent agreement for the UAE to transport oil through the TIPLINE to 
the Mediterranean, putting the deal on hold, indicating oil transit deals with major energy 
producers have become less relevant to Israel’s energy security strategy.312 
In short, Israel’s new energy abundance has made its connection to oil and coal 
suppliers, oil industry operations, and energy diplomacy with great powers less necessary. 
Instead, Israel has prioritized the creation of a new regional natural gas market which 
supports its domestic natural gas production ambitions, even though prices for its 
domestically-produced gas have been higher than purchasing gas from global natural gas 
producers.313 
3. Approach To Energy Foreign Relations 
The thesis’ second pair of hypotheses considered how increased energy 
independence would affect Israel’s approach to relations with energy partners, particularly 
regarding energy related projects, negotiations, and disputes. The “combative” hypothesis 
2A proposed that, when states are less dependent on imports, they act more forcefully or 
aggressively in pursuit of their energy interests, as they are less constrained by potential 
negative political or economic repercussions imposed on them by other states. In contrast, 
the “collaborative” 2B hypothesis argued that states act more cooperatively toward other 
states, as they have more to gain politically or economically from fostering positive 
interactions. For the collaborative hypothesis to be supported, Israel would have become 
more willing to negotiate mutually beneficial energy agreements, pursue joint or 
multilateral energy initiatives, and amicably settle disputes.  
This thesis finds that, when its domestic energy supply increased, Israel adopted a 
more collaborative approach to its energy foreign relations. Israel views its relationships 
with energy partners less combatively than in the past, as it sees the growth and success of 
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a regional natural gas market as fundamental to its own long term energy security. Israel 
demonstrated a collaborative approach through its increased focus on negotiating 
international agreements over contested maritime territory, coordinating regional gas 
infrastructure and export initiatives, and promoting mechanisms to resolve commercial 
disputes. 
Israel has used natural gas to build rapport with regional states by negotiating 
international agreements that support Israel’s ambition to grow the regional natural gas 
market. Israel accelerated maritime boundary negotiations with Lebanon and the PA, albeit 
through neutral parties, to facilitate the development of offshore natural gas fields in 
contested territory. Israel’s openness to allowing Egyptian-Palestinian development of the 
Gaza gas field is a dramatic shift in policy, compared to 2003, when Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon refused to allow British Gas to sell Gaza gas to Israel due to a concern about how 
the funds given to the Palestinian treasury would be used.314 Energy abundance has also 
allowed Israel to exercise strategic patience, waiting to establish maritime boundary 
agreements before exploiting offshore resources. Rather than aggressively exploiting 
offshore natural gas fields in contested territory like Israel did in the Sinai after the war in 
1967, the state pursued international agreements with Cyprus, Lebanon, Egypt, and the PA, 
to avoid an escalation of tensions.  
Israel has also supported the bilateral and multilateral development of regional 
natural gas infrastructure, organizations, and alliances, which indicate Israel sees its energy 
interests as aligned with other Eastern Mediterranean natural gas suppliers. One could 
argue that Israel primarily seeks to cooperate with Egypt and Cyprus due to logistical 
necessity; however, Israel had the option to sell directly to major natural gas producers and 
instead chose to use its natural gas to work with its neighbors. Israel has also encouraged 
foreign ownership of its gas fields and multinational E&P operations, sharing the wealth, 
so to speak, with regional partners. Israel’s confidence in its energy abundance allowed it 
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to promote greater collaboration, to invest in regional gas pipeline infrastructure and the 
mutually beneficial export ambitions of its neighbors.315 
Israel has also sought to depoliticize commercial energy disputes and by supporting 
mechanisms that promote commercial-level energy cooperation and dispute resolution. In 
contrast to Israel’s de facto nationalization of Iran’s financial stake in the TIPLINE after 
Iran ended its oil exports to Israel, the Israeli Ministry of Energy and IEC treated the breach 
of contract over Egyptian gas exports as a “business conflict and not a clash between 
governments,” pursuing international arbitration over the incident to recoup costs and 
settling with Egypt, based on Israel’s goal of re-establishing energy ties with Egypt.316 
Additionally, in March 2021, after 9 years of negotiations, the energy ministers of Cyprus 
and Israel agreed to a framework to resolve ownership of 10% of Aphrodite, which satisfied 
both countries.317 Israel’s role as a founding member of the EMGF and continued efforts 
to promote intergovernmental communication related to natural gas also indicates the state 
is highly motivated to ensure the amicable resolution of energy-related disputes.  
Israel’s new energy abundance has increased the value of Israel’s collaboration with 
its regional neighbors, as potential customers, and fellow gas suppliers. Israel’s emphasis 
on multilateral projects, regional infrastructure, and conflict resolution indicates Israel 
views the benefits to be gained through transforming the regional energy system around 
natural gas and renewables are essential for Israel’s long-term energy security. 
4. 2013-Today: Protectionist-Collaboration 
To summarize, since 2013, Israel has adopted a protectionist-collaborative 
approach to energy security, prioritizing greater autonomy from the global energy market 
in favor of greater self-reliance while also acting more cooperatively with regional states 
to promote the growth of natural gas usage in the region. In some ways, the protectionist-
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collaborative nomenclature appears counterintuitive; however, these two trends reflect the 
complexities of Israel’s historic energy situation as well as its present challenges. Israel’s 
present approach to valuing increased “protectionist isolationism” from oil and coal 
imports reflects both Israel’s historic bad blood with importers, the weaponization of oil 
by OPEC, and fatigue with reliance on great powers, combined with Israel’s newly 
discovered confidence in its self-sufficiency as a regional energy power. As Israel now 
enjoys a sense of greater energy independence, the government has the luxury of behaving 
more collaboratively toward its neighbors, particularly as the state views greater political 
and economic benefit from cooperation with regional states. Israel’s seemingly 
contradictory protectionist-collaborative approach to energy security also supports Israel’s 
paradoxical strategies of aggressive deterrence against anti-Zionist adversaries and 
normalization with Gulf monarchies. In short, Israel’s abundant offshore gas resources has 
simultaneously encouraged Israel to increase its energy protectionism in terms of 
promoting self-sufficiency, while also promoting regional natural gas initiatives and 
exports.  
C. IMPLICATIONS 
This section examines four primary implications of the thesis’ findings related to 
Israel’s economy, Israel’s security, regional peace and stability, and the larger body of 
energy security literature. First, because Israel’s protectionist approach has delayed a 
government windfall and led to higher natural gas prices for Israel’s economy, Israel may 
adjust its sourcing decisions in the future to balance its economic interests. Second, 
although Israel has reduced its susceptibility to supply disruption or high oil prices from 
imports, the state’s tolerance level in response to energy security threats to its domestic 
resources depends on its ability to find sufficient substitutes following a loss of supply. 
Third, although Israel is more likely to act collaboratively in response to its energy 
abundance, its energy relations are shaped by its internal politics and the politics of its 
regional energy partners. Lastly, although it is difficult to draw direct lines of causation, 
the research findings suggest that energy abundance may encourage states to act less 
unilaterally interventionalist and more congenially in foreign policy decisions. 
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First, the research findings related to Israel’s domestic response to natural gas 
resources have implications for Israel’s future economic growth. Israel’s domestic policy 
decisions have tried to balance promoting its nascent natural gas industry, supplying its 
domestic consumers with competitive prices, and collecting government revenue from the 
natural gas industry. Despite efforts to balance competing interests, some policies, such as 
anti-trust regulations, have had a detrimental impact on commercial profits, by slowing the 
commercial development of its natural gas fields and delaying the government’s expected 
windfall. As such, Israel’s approach to the global energy market may adjust its focus in the 
future to increase government revenues over protecting its domestic supply. Additionally, 
because the policy of requiring natural gas sales to supply the domestic market first has 
also likely contributed to higher costs to Israel’s economy, policymakers may shift to a 
more integrationist approach depending on the activities of commercial gas companies and 
domestic gas market conditions. Should domestic gas prices become too high, the IEC may 
consider purchasing lower priced natural gas imports to improve domestic energy costs. 
Lastly, Israel’s ambition as a regional energy power is contingent on its ability to monetize 
its offshore energy resources. Although Israel’s domestic economic conditions have been 
favorable, the profitability of its natural gas exports and the potential for ambitious 
undersea pipeline projects are still susceptible to market conditions. Yet, because natural 
gas prices are generally regionally dependent and the gas supplies fall under Israel’s direct 
control, the government likely views a protectionist-collaborative energy strategy as the 
most effective way to balance a stable, reliable, long-term energy supply for Israel with 
hopes of substantial government revenues from regional exports. 
Second, the research findings have implications for Israel’s security risks. Israel’s 
increased reliance on domestic offshore resources and the IDF mission to protect Israel’s 
gas rigs has increased the symbolic and strategic significance of energy as a target for 
Israel’s adversaries, and increased the likelihood that an attack on Israel’s domestic energy 
resources could provoke a more forceful response from Israel’s military. Although 
nationalist language is common for politicians to use when speaking to domestic audiences, 
statements by Israeli politicians have demonstrated some of the pitfalls of Israel’s decision 
to place heavier emphasis on its domestic energy resources, as foundational to the state’s 
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energy mix. While energy abundance has allowed Israel to consume less oil and coal, 
Israel’s increased dependence on local sources of energy have only transferred the supply 
disruption risks, not eliminated them. Historically, Israel has not viewed energy security as 
a reason to go to war; however, a state’s calculation on the existential threat of energy 
disruption primarily depends on the ability for its supply to be satisfactorily substituted. 
The real consideration regarding Israel’s predisposition to take forceful action over energy 
resources depends on how well Israel develops alternative sources of natural gas and/or 
renewable resources. At the same time, the limits of Israel’s collaborative responses to 
neighbors over energy projects deserve deeper analysis. 
Third, the thesis’ findings have implications for regional peace and stability. 
Israel’s tendency to act more collaboratively in response to energy abundance suggests that 
more combative or resource nationalist behavior is most commonly a response to energy 
scarcity. While energy scarcity is more likely to motivate resource nationalist behavior, 
recent natural gas discoveries have discouraged Israel from engaging in combative energy 
behavior, as it perceives its energy situation to be more stable and secure. It is important to 
note that, although Israel has generally adopted a more collaborative approach to its energy 
security, the state’s policy decisions depend on domestic politics as well as the domestic 
politics of its regional neighbors. It is unlikely that Israel would act benevolently should a 
hostile actor attempt to sabotage Israel’s domestic energy production, and unlikely that 
Israel would act cooperatively if an export partner stopped paying their gas bill for political 
reasons. Yet, Israel’s tendency for collaboration does have implications for the concern 
that the Israel-Egypt-Cyprus-Greece energy alliance is exacerbating tensions with Turkey. 
Although many commentators have highlighted how competition over natural gas has 
increased the risk for military confrontation, both Israel and Turkey have shown an interest 
in renewing energy ties. In 2017, Israel imported $40 million of crude petroleum from 
Turkey, equating to less than 2% of Israel’s total crude oil imports, which increased to 
$2.43 billion in 2019 or 33.7% of Israel’s crude oil imports in 2019.318 Additionally, 
Turkey invited former Energy Minister Steinitz to attend an international diplomacy 
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conference in April 2021 and, according to a statement by the office of the Turkish 
Presidency in July 2021, President Erdoğan discussed cooperation in energy, tourism, and 
technology with Israeli President Isaac Herzog.319 In short, Israel’s relations with Turkey 
could promote an amelioration of energy tensions in the region. 
Lastly, the research findings have implications for the broader energy security 
literature. Due to the difficulties of establishing causal factors and directions of causation 
in state behavior and foreign policy decisions, this thesis did not attempt to determine 
whether Israel’s energy abundance has led to an adjustment in Israel’s interest in strategic 
partnership or international engagement with legacy oil suppliers such as Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, or influenced Israel’s calculus in on-going conflicts. While some have 
speculated that the United States’ interest in foreign intervention in the Middle East has 
waned due to a decline in the energy significance of U.S. security presence in the Gulf 
region, it is difficult to draw a similar comparison for Israel, due to a lack of insight into 
the energy-related motivations of Israel’s current foreign policy behavior and the presence 
of multiple factors shaping Israel’s national security strategy and foreign policy decisions. 
However, the research findings do suggest that, in general, energy abundance likely 
encourages less unilaterally interventionist and more congenial foreign policy.  
D. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research could build upon the findings of this thesis by exploring the 
emerging role of renewables and electricity in Israel’s energy security strategy. Although 
Israel’s transition to renewables has been slow, the state has goals for greater regional 
collaboration in renewable energies. Israel has already promoted its role as a technological 
pioneer in solar energy. Additionally, although Israel has historically limited its connection 
to the electrical grids of its Arab neighbors, the construction of the EuroAsia Interconnector 
would be extraordinary, as it would end Israel’s plight as a quintessential energy island by 
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connecting Israel to Europe’s electrical grid. It would be interesting to conduct further 
research if/when the EuroAsia construction is completed to see if there are changes to 
Israel’s electricity policies with Egypt, Jordan, and the PA in response to greater energy 
abundance provided by its connection to European electricity.  
Further research could also identify shifts in Israel’s energy vulnerabilities, 
specifically related to renewables and electricity. As natural gas is expected to fuel Israel’s 
growing electricity demand, all of the large-scale energy projects outlined in Israel’s 2019 
infrastructure workplan involved electricity generation, transmission, and distribution.320 
While Israel’s increased self-sufficiency makes it less susceptible to volatile oil prices, 
power outages due to technical malfunctions or cyber-attacks against Israel’s energy 
infrastructure have become a growing security concern.321 In January 2016, Israel’s 
electrical grid was targeted by a severe cyber-attack, and in January 2020, Israel thwarted 
a cyber-attack against one of its power stations.322 While Israel’s adversaries may not 
target natural gas offshore platforms directly, as Israel expands the network, pipelines, and 
scope of its regional gas market, the complexity of Israel’s energy security concerns will 
also inevitably increase. Additional research could be conducted about the specific risks of 
greater dependence on electricity, as electricity cannot be stored, which is another example 
of Israel transferring rather than eliminating risk.323 Finally, if Israel continues to prioritize 
self-sufficiency in combination with deregulating its electrical grid, unexpected black swan 
events have the potential to have a much larger than expected impact. Examples such as 
the U.S. East Coast run on gas stations following the ransomware attack against Colonial 
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Pipeline and the widespread blackouts in Texas in response to freezing temperatures 
demonstrate the types of energy security concerns Israel could face in the future.324 
In conclusion, the activities of Israel’s diplomats and government officials indicate 
that energy self-sufficiency and cooperation have become top priorities for Israel. The 
connection between former Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz and Egyptian Petroleum 
Minister Tarek El Molla was considered one of the cornerstones of Israeli-Egyptian 
bilateral ties.325 In some respects, energy abundance has enabled Israel to reduce the risk 
of politically motivated oil supply disruption, the negative impact of high oil prices, and 
coal pollution while also promoting its natural gas ambitions through multinational 
initiatives with regional partners. Although some of Israel’s energy challenges have 
improved, further exploration into the nature of potential future energy crises and supply 
disruptions are important due to the fundamental difficulties in predicting the impact of 
energy dynamics on state behavior and regional stability. 
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